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"

"A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself at the
outset in a polemical and criticalguise, as superseding the
existing mode of thinking and existing concrete thought (the
existing culturalworld). First of all, therefore, it must be a
criticism of 'common sense', basing itself initially,
however, on common sense in order to demonstrate that
'everyone' is a philosopher and that it is not a question of
introducingfrom scratch a scientific form of thought into
everyone 's individual life, but of renovating and making
'critical'an already existing activity.
Introduction
It is difficult to introduce a reader not privy to the current debate on European
private law, what it is understood by "social dimension" within it. Indeed the idea
is quite minimal and it has been spelled out in a recent "Manifesto on Social
Justice in European Private Law", in which a group of scholars have dedicated a
few academic meetings to express the feeling that the current "technocratic"
clothing of legal Europe is highly questionable; that European private law cannot
be constructed as a merely technical, neutral, exercise of institution building, but
rather its "political dimension" should be clearly recognized; that, to the contrary,
Brussels handles the European private law process as a matter strictly functional
to the needs of the construction of an open market; and that what suffers in this
process is "social justice." 2
While the foes of the project are clearly spelled out in the Manifesto as the
"technocrats and bureaucrats" in Brussels, a lot of self-restraint is exercised when
it comes to a self critique of the role of legal academia in the process of
Europeanization of Private law. In contrast, we portray as deeply problematic the
many issues related to a line of scholarship now developing as a well founded
3
industry by
the institutions in Brussels.
1 ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 330 (International Publishers,

trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 1971). See the influence of Gramsci on PARTHA
CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES

(1993).
2 See Social Justice in European ContractLaw: A Manifesto, Study Group on Social Justice in
Europeanprivate Law, rapporteurHugh Collins, 10 EUR. L.J. 6, 653-674 (2004) [hereinafter the
Social Justice Manifesto].
3 While some resource-controlling scholars are more ready to yield to a pattern of influence and
prestige connected to the self-appointed role of "private legislators", others have allied with the
project of resisting the European Commission agenda while coalescing around the Social Justice
Manifesto.
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This paper aims to show what are the political, rather than the technical
stakes in the current debate over the harmonization of private law in Europe. Part
One analyzes the main actors, the legal sources, the ideological divide and the
process animating the current debate on European Private Law. It sheds light on
the incremental transformation of European private law in a scholarly industry.
Part Two sheds light on the main obstacles and inconsistencies that jurists
encounter in envisioning a Social private law. We argue that the notion of the
"Social" in private law scholarship as well as the idea of "Social Europe" is rarely
a useful notion to articulate a progressive agenda for European private law.
Finally, in Part Three we offer some modest proposal of methodological and
strategic nature on the possibilities and the limitations of setting a progressive
agenda for European Private Law. We argue that a progressive agenda for
European private law can be conceived today as a significant platform only by
breaking with the current hegemonies and ideologies as well as by unveiling the
transformation of European private law into a scholarly industry.
In light of Antonio Gramsci's notion of a philosophy of praxis, we hope
that this paper will spark further thoughts and self-criticism on current
mainstream, progressive and neoliberal project tackling the harmonization of
private law in the European Union.
I.

The Europeanization of Private Law: Legal Sources, Ideology and
Process
1. Legal Sources in European Private Law

It will be useful for our reader not familiar in the intricacies of E.U. law to offer
some context in which the current issues are unfolding. Unlike the United States,
the EU did not create a system of federal courts, thus what is largely understood
as European private law results from a complex interplay of harmonizing
directives and national private law regimes. The process of private law
harmonization encompasses a large number of legal sources and institutional
actors both at the European and at the national level.
European private law comprises a variety of legal rules, which derive from
legislative, judicial and scholarly sources operating at different levels of
government.5 The legislative source of European private law comprises both the
' Sources of law also known in comparative law as legal formants primarily refer to a legislative,

judicial and scholarly source. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants. A Dynamic Approach to
Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991); RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO
COMPARATO, 1980; Rodolfo Sacco, Souvenirs d'un vieux comparatiste, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR

[Z. Eu. P.] 727 (2002).
See P.G. Monateri & Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants, in
ECONOMICS AND THE LAw, 531 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT
5
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body of EU legislation, namely directives that created a patchwork harmonization
of private law rules, and national legal rules enshrined in continental Civil Codes,
"which in some cases are naturally converging." 6 Finally, European private law
encompasses also those legal provisions, which transpose European directives that
Member States introduced into their pre-existent civil codes. European lawyers
have therefore plunged in this complicated scenario in which European legal
traditions encounter different legal sources as well as different levels of
governments.7 Our essay predominantly focuses on the legislative source, namely
a number of directives that the European Commission has proposed to harmonize
the field of European private law.8 The Community institutions include the
European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament.
The Commission acts both as a legislative and as an executive branch and is
composed by twenty-five commissioners who are appointed for five years with
the power to initiate legislative processes. 9 The Council of Ministers is composed
by representatives at ministerial level of the twenty-five Member States, who can
commit their government to Community policies.10 The European Parliament
(EP) is composed of 732 members, who are directly elected by European citizens
for five-year terms. Together, the Council and the EP perform as a two-house
legislature adopting Community acts, which can be either regulations or
directives. While regulations have general application, are binding in their entirety
and are directly applicable in all Member States, directives need to be transposed
into Member States' legal orders to become fully binding." Even though Member
States are obliged to attain the goal set up by the directive or "the result to be
12
achieved," they maintain discretion over implementing measures.
Under Articles 94 and 95 EC, which indicate that the goal of
harmonization is the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the
Community enjoys a relatively broad power to issue directives to harmonize

See Aurelia Colombi-Ciacchi, Late Payment Directive of the EC and its implementation,
E.R.P.L. (2005).
7 See Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Halfof the
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 671-700 (2002).
8 In particular we will use as an example a well-know directive in European contract law, Council
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 of April 1993 O.J. (L095) 29-34 [hereinafter Unfair Terms directive].
9 See EC Treaty art. 211 (defining the power of the Commission); see also Paul Craig and Grdinne
de Burca, EULaw : Text, Cases, and Materials, 59 (3d ed. 2003)..
10 See EC Treaty art. 203; see also Paul Craig and Grdinne de Burca, supra, at 65.
1 See EC Treaty art. 249.
12 See EC Treaty art. 249 EC. Directives are distinct from classic federal legislation in that
Member States can choose with some flexibility, which type of national instrument to implement
in order to achieve the prescribed goal. See Paul Craig and Grdinne de Bfirca, supra note 10 at
114-15.
6
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specific private law rules. 1 3 The main difference between these provisions is that
under Article 94 EC the Council decides by unanimity after consulting the EP,
whereas under Article 95 EC the Council decides by majority voting through the
co-decision procedure, whereby the EP has a co-equal role. 14 First introduced by
the Maastricht Treaty, today the co-decision procedure or "Community-method"
has become the basic Community legislative process.15 Under Article 251 EC the
co-decision proceeds as follows: the Commission drafts a text, then the Council
and the EP can amend and approve the text through the adoption of a common
position or the intervention of a conciliation committee. Following the approval of
a directive, Member States must transpose it into their national legal systems.
In the mid-1980s the Commission began the harmonization of private law
in the realm of consumer contracts for door-to-door sales and product liability
rules. 16 By the end of the 1980s, numerous consumer contracts directives created
a body of European private law tackling consumer policy, which was only
expressly included under the competence of the Community by the Maastricht
Treaty (1992).
Even though these directives regulated consumer issues, their
main goal was the establishment and functioning of the internal market, based on
Article 95 EC, rather than the creation of a body of European consumer policy
under Article 153 EC.18
The term "harmonization" or approximation of the laws was introduced in the original Treaty of
Rome (1958) under article 100 (now 94EC) with the goal of eliminating the distortions of
competition created by the laws of the Member States. The Single European Act (1987) adopted
article 100A (now 95 EC) which required majority voting rather than unanimity to achieve the
approximation of national measures for the establishment and functioning of the common market.
In contrast, Moreover, under Article 95 EC the Council decides via majority voting through a codecision procedure, art 251 EC in which Council and EP share equal powers, see
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/index.htm; Walter van Gerven, Harmonization of
PrivateLaw: Do we need it?, 41 C.M.L.R. 505 (2004).
" The co-decision procedure is laid down in EC Treaty art. 251 (ex-189b).
15 See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BlRCA, supra note 10 at 144-147; on the Community
method
13

see Joanne Scott and David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance
in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1, 1-18 (2002).
16 See Council Directive 85/577/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31-33. to protect the consumer in respect
of contracts negotiated away from business premises (hereinafter Doorstep Selling directive) and
the Product Liability directive.
17 See EC Treaty art. 153; STEPHEN WEATHERILL; supra note 9 (describing how EC consumer
policy constructed its identity in the shadow of fundamental constitutional omissions from the
original treaty); see also G. Howells, Soft law and Consumer law in LAW MAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (P. Craig and C. Harlow. Eds., 1998).
s From 1985 to 1999 the Commission agenda triggered off seven directives on European contract
law. See the GREEN PAPER ON CONSUMER PROTECTION (2001). The most recent
European legislation in contract law is the Directive on Consumer Sales and Associated
Guarantees (1999/44), described by the EC in the Green Paper as a "recent attempt by the
Commission to harmonize the disparate existing laws of the Member States concerning implied
warranties in consumer sales" at 7.
4
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The legal scholarship source of European private law comprises
publications, casebooks or doctrinal commentaries addressing European contract
and tort law. 19 These materials enable scholars to expose the views of "la
doctrine" to influence both national and European educational legal systems. In
order to obtain greater convergence of European legal education to achieve a
European common law, academics advocate for a greater role of scholarship in
channelling the harmonization process. 20 The focus of this essay is primarily on
this source and what we will define as the scholarship industry promoted by
European lawyers.
Finally, the judicial source in European private law includes the domestic
courts jurisprudence, which interprets European directives and the growing body
of ECJ jurisprudence. The case law of the ECJ raises tension. This is well known
in the United States in the domain of the general federal common law, 2 1 and it
concerns the role of the ECJ in the interpretation of private law rules, traditionally
22
interpreted by domestic courts.
The ECJ can only interpret directives via two procedural grounds. The first
concerns a suit brought before the ECJ by the Commission under Article 226
EC.23 The Commission polices Member States for their incorrect or late
implementation of directives and has the discretion to sue those governments that
are reluctant to follow its recommendations on the "correct" transposition of
directives. 24 This procedure raises numerous problems on what should be the
correct transposition of directives by those Member States with profoundly
diverse legal systems and national legal traditions.2 5
The second procedural ground allows individuals to bring actions before
their national courts raising preliminary questions on the interpretation of EC law.
By means of the procedure of Article 234 EC, national judges have the discretion
to refer such questions to the ECJ for preliminary rulings.2 6 This instrument has
19
20

See Christophe Jamin and Phillippe Jestaz, La Doctrine(2004)

See Walter van Gerven, Codifying European Private Law (2001); Bridging (Private) Laws
Closer to Each other at the European Level (2005) papers available at
http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/ccle/pdf/2005-01-18_WvG Impact courtsonprivate_aw.pdf.
21 See Erie Railroadv. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) when the
U.S. Supreme Court overturned
the Swift v. Tyson [1842] by rejecting the existence of a "Federal General Common Law."
22 See Peter Roll, What is the Role of the ECJ in EC Private Law?
A Comment on the ECJ
judgments in Oceano Grupo, FreiburgerKommunalbauten, Leitner and Veedfald, 1 HANSE L.
REV. 6 (2005)

See
See
See
See

EC Treaty art. 226.
Case C-52/00, Comm'nv. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3827.
25
Case C-478/99, Comm'nv. Sweden, 2000 E.C.R. 1-04147.
26
EC Treaty art. 234 "The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning: the interpretation of this Treaty; the validity and interpretation of acts of the
institutions of the Community and of the ECB; the interpretation of the statutes of bodies
established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. Where such a question is
23

24
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been fundamental to effectively enforce the new rights and remedies granted by
EC law directly to individuals and to groups.2 7 Domestic courts have largely
contributed to the expansion and application of EC law, even though their
behaviour varies significantly in each Member State. Jurists pointed out that
within the same legal system, legal elites, who were initially reluctant to refer
preliminary questions to the ECJ, later began to deploy preliminary rulings as a
means for their judicial empowerment.2 8
Scholars wrote extensively on the uniqueness of this judicial exchange
between domestic and European courts, depicting it as a constitutional and
participatory dialogue between national and supranational judges. Some jurists
stressed how the constitutionalization of EC law has progressively empowered
national courts as the "agents of the Community order" vis a vis Member States. 29
In contrast, others highlighted that such processes vary greatly depending on the
attitude of national judges in sheepishly adopting or resisting EC law and its
interpretation by the ECJ.3 0
In this vein, by shifting their attention from European integration towards
the behaviour of domestic courts and national interest groups, commentators are
increasingly focusing on the preliminary reference mechanism as a unique
standpoint to understand the judicial dialogue and cooperation in the EU.3 1
Finally, Micklitz has openly addressed the problem of political legitimacy in
conjunction with patterns of judicial cooperation in different legal fields. He has
highlighted that any inquiry of judicial cooperation in the EU needs to take into
account the "preparedness of national courts to use preliminary rulings" as well as
"the way in which courts react to ECJ judgments." 3 2

,

raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers
that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court
or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national
law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice."
27 For the EC doctrines of direct effect and state liability see Paul Craig and Grdinne
de Bfirca,
supra note 12.
28 See Paul Craig, Report on the United Kingdom, at 220-1, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND
NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE : LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT

(Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, and J.H.H. Weiler eds., 1998).
29 Id.; Alec Stone Sweet, ConstitutionalDialogue in the European Community, at 308.
30 See L. Niglia, The Non-Europeanizationof Private Law, ERPL 9, 575 (2001);
LISA CONANT,
JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002).
31 See LABOUR LAW IN THE COURTS: NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
(Silvana Sciarra ed., 2001).
32 See Hans-W. Micklitz, The Politics of Co-operation
in the EU (2005) at 27.
6
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2. Technocracy at work: What is the Common Frame of Reference?
Today, anybody pursuing the task of reading the numerous articles on European
private law will encounter the notion of a "Common Frame of Reference", which
was created by the European Commission in its attempt to further harmonization
while at the same time using a tool which would be perceived by the Member
States as a less top-down form of regulation.
The Commission as a hybrid is the EC executive branch but it also retains
the power of initiative over Community legislation. In setting its EC legislative
agenda, the Commission's committees are continuously consulting the Council,
the EP and other supranational bodies to determine the course of future legislative
activities. 33- However, in response to the increasing democratic concerns raised by
policy-makers and academics on the Community method, in 2001 the
Commission launched an extensively advertised survey of the stakeholders who
are likely to be affected by EC regulations. The Commission aimed at improving
the quality and the effectiveness of Community re-regulation, while at the same
time promoting soft law and new forms of governance to complement the
Community method.3 4 In the realm of European contract law the Commission
consulted stakeholders and academics on whether to continue with a sectoral
intervention, namely via sectoral directives and soft law instruments, or rather
adopt a more comprehensive and "hard" European Civil Code.35
In February 2003, the European Commission published an Action Plan
aimed at achieving greater coherence in European contract law.36 The Action Plan
continues the ongoing debate with stakeholders and academics launched in 2001
to foster dialogue on the practical as well as technical problems arising from the
divergence of national contract law regimes. By targeting the obstacles, which
prevent the 'smooth functioning' of the internal market, the Action Plan aspired to
improve the quality of Community regulation through legislative transparency and
stakeholders' participation.
In the Action Plan the Commission is careful to take further action in the
field of contract law but uncertain on the tools such as hard and soft, sectoral or
See Christian Joerges, 'Good Governance' through Comitology?, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL
REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS (Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos eds., 1999).
34 See JOANNE SCOTT & GRAINNE DE BURCA G. EDS., CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOVERNANCE IN
33

EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2006).

See Communication on European ContractLaw, COM (2001) 398.
See Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parliamentand the Council - A
More Coherent European Contract Law - An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final O.J. 2003, C
63/01.
37 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
European ContractLaw, COM (2001) 398 final, OJ 2001, C 55/01 (hereafter Green Paper); Dirk
Staudemayer, The Commission Action Plan on European Contract Law, 2 E.R.P.L. 113(2003)
113-127.
35
36
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comprehensive measures to achieve an efficient and coherent regulation of
contract law. In departing from a European codification, the Action Plan chooses
to ameliorate the existent contract acquis communautaire,38 by improving its
coherence through both hard measures and soft ones,3 9 in particular a non-binding
Common Frame of Reference (CFR).4 0 By this point it was already abundantly
clear that the harmonization of contract law was the minimalist approach that the
Commission could reach more easily and with less opposition than undertaking
fields such as property or family law.
Similar to the United States Restatement of Contracts, the CFR aims to
increase the coherence of the contract law acquis and to achieve the uniform
application of directives. But the language of the Commission carefully avoids the
term "code" while adopting the softer notion of CFR. This still obscure tool
should provide common principles, terminology and rules for contract law to
address gaps, conflicts and ambiguities emerging from the application of
European contract law.4 2
The acquis communautaireis the result of the body of directives mostly harmonizing consumer
contracts and product liability and their common interpretation by the ECJ which constitutes the
core of European private law. See R. Schulze, The Acquis Communautaireand the Development of
European Contract Law at 15 in R. SCHULZE, M. EBERS AND H.C. GRIGOLEIT, INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS AND FORMATION OF CONTRACT IN THE ACQUIs COMMUNAUTAIRE (explaining the
development of a European contract acquis).
39 In the field of European private law the Commission has used legislation adopted through the
Community method or "hard law" to harmonize European private law. These hard measures
(directives, regulations) are enforced by national and European courts and they are mandatory as
well as binding tools of regulation. However, in response to the increasing democratic concerns
the Community method; in 2001 the Commission launched an extensive inquiry to improve the
quality and the effectiveness of Community re-regulation and at the same time promoting soft law
and new forms of governance to complement the Community method. Soft law measures are not
fully binding, they are voluntary and they can, according to some scholars, achieve better goals by
departing from a command and control strategy. See David Trubek and Louise Trubek, Hard and
Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe, 11 ELJ Vol. 3, 343-364 (2005) and GRAINNE DE
BURCA AND JOANNE SCOTT, LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (2006) at 2-4.
4 See Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parliamentand the Council - A
More CoherentEuropean ContractLaw - An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final OJ 2003, C 63/01
38

at 77 addressing consolidation, codification and the existing instruments as possible means to
achieve greater coherence and at FN 56 "The codification means the adoption of a new legal
instrument which brings together in a single text, but without changing the substance of a previous
instrument and it successive amendments, with the new instrument replacing the old one and
repealing it".
41 See on European property law Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European
Integration: The Case of Property, 10 EUR. L.J., 6, 751-765 (2004); and on European family law,
Marella Maria Rosaria, The Non-Subversive Function of European Private Law: The Case of
HarmonizationofFamily Law, 12 EUR. L.J., 78-105 (2006).
42 See Action Plan, Executive Summary at 1, paragraphs 4.1 and 4.1.1 "1[.. the Commission will
seek to increase, where necessary and possible, coherence between instruments, which are part of
8
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According to the Commission, the non-uniform implementation of
directives by Member States leads to inconsistencies and fragmentation of
contract regimes, creating different legal rules for the same commercial
situation.4 3 The Commission maintains that a non-uniform application of contract
rules entails high transaction costs burdening both industries and 'active'
consumers in search of precious information. High transaction costs emerge not
only in the phase of formation of cross-border contracts, but also through judicial
control over the fairness of contractual terms.
In order to achieve greater
coherence in the application of European contract law and consequently reduce
transaction costs, the Commission's strictly functionalist approach is to improve
the quality of the existing acquis communautaire. In short, the Action Plan
reinforces the view that the existence of different contract law regimes creates a
barrier to trade for cross-border transactions within the internal market, thus
coherence means more efficient outcomes which can be reached through better
46
uniformity in implementation
and maximal harmonization.
In response to the Action Plan, the European Parliament, traditionally
proactive in matters of private law codification having endorsed this idea since the
late 1980s, also recognized the need of further harmonization in order to facilitate
cross-border transactions within the internal market.4 Even though the EP offered
its political guidance to drive further Europeanization of contract law, it warned
the Commission not to overstep the boundaries of Community competences.
Article 5 EC, stating the principle of attributed competences of the Community, is
the major concern of supranational institutions. In response, the Commission
increasingly argued that via greater coherence in the acquis, through maximal

the EC contract law acquis, both in their drafting and in their implementation and application,
Proposals will, where appropriate, take into account a common frame of reference, which the
Commission intends to elaborate via research and with the help of all interested parties. This
common frame of reference should provide for best solutions in terms of common terminology
and rules (...)."
43 See Action Plan at § 16-24 and § 57. On this point see R. Sacco, L 'Interpreteet la regle de droit
europeenne in LES MULTIPLES LANGUES DU DROIT (Rodolfo Sacco ed., 2001).
" See Action Plan at § 25-5 1.
1 Id. at § 34-36. - for example more information is necessary for different national mandatory
rules limiting or excluding contractual liability.
46

Id at § 57 "An improved acquis should enhance the uniform application of Community law as

well as facilitate the smooth functioning of cross-border transactions, and thereby the completion
of the internal market."
17 See EP final report on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council - A more coherent European contract law - An action plan COM (2003) 68-A50256/2003 9 July 2003). Here the EP argues that new harmonizing directives on contract law
should be base EC Treaty art. 95 and, in the aftermath of the Tobacco advertising judgement, there
should have as a primary goal the achievement and functioning of the internal market.
4 See D. Staudemayer, supra note 37 at 116-117.
9
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harmonization and less differentiation, European contract law would serve the
goal of eliminating obstacles to integration, rather than creating new ones.
In drafting the Action Plan the Commission technocrats emphasized that
the CFR would eliminate market inefficiencies arising from the diverse
implementation of European directives, ensuring greater coherence in their
interpretation by courts. According to the Commission, the CFR should provide
jurists with a solution to the costly problem of the non-uniform interpretation of
European contract law due to vague terms and rules.4 9 In 2004 the Commission
was confident that the CFR would improve the coherence of the existing and
50

future acquis.

According to the Action Plan, incoherencies in European contract law are
triggered by vague legal concepts introduced by the directives. 1 In particular, two
types of problems arise when the directives contain vague terminology. First,
directives adopt "broadly defined legal concepts," therefore leaving too much
*
52
discretion in their implementation
to national legislators or judges. Second,
directives introduce legal concepts that are "alien to the existing national
legislation," thus providing puzzlement and leeway for new statutory
interpretations by courts.53 Thus, when judges face vague terms, they can either
interpret them by referring to the broad principles of the acquis communautaire,
or they can refer to the particular goals of the directive in question. While the
latter interpretation is problematic, because it leads to high "fragmentation of
national legislation," according to the Commission the former interpretation will
promote greater coherence in European contract law.
As an example the
Commission openly referred to the Leitner judgement as a problematic case,
because the ECJ followed the substance but not the formal reasoning deployed by

-

' See Action Plan at § 18.
50 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council
European ContractLaw and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, at 3, COM (2004) 651
(hereinafter The way forward) "[...] the Commission will use the CFR as a toolbox, where
appropriate, when presenting proposals to improve the quality and coherence of the existing acquis
and future legal instruments in the area of contract law. At the same time, it will serve the purpose
of simplifying the acquis. The CFR will provide clear definitions of legal terms, fundamental
principles and coherent model rules of contract law, drawing on the EC acquis and on nest
solutions found in Member States legal orders."
51 Id. at 2-3 summarizes the four problems addressed by the action plane 1) the use of abstract
terms, 2) application of directives 3) differences between national implementing laws 4)
inconsistencies in EC contract law legislation.
52 See Counsel Directive 90/314/EEC, Package Travel Directive, O.J. (L 158) 59-64, which was
the option taken by Advocate general Tizzano in Leitner but the court did not follow. In that case
the court preferred to interpret the notion of damage in light of the mere textualist reading of the
Package Travel directive
531 Id. at § 19- 21 addressing the ECJ judgments Travel Vac § 17 and Leitner § 21.
5 See Action Plan, at 21.
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the A.G Tizzano in interpreting the notion of damage enshrined in Article 4 of the
directive. The A.G. suggested that the notion of damage should be interpreted in
light of the acquis communautaire by referring to other European directives and
precedents, whereas the ECJ decided to interpret the notion of damage in
connection with the limited purpose of the package holiday directive." In doing
so the Court was not constrained from the acquis communautaire, but it
interpreted the notion of damage in light of the particular circumstances of the
case. The concern raised by the Commission was that the wide interpretive
discretion of the ECJ might be in conflict with the goal of the Community
decision maker in regulating the single market, thus undermining the legitimacy
of EU law.
Recently the Commission has openly selected two legal instruments to
achieve greater coherence in European contract law. In October 2004 the
Commission committed to a maximal level of harmonization as a means to avoid
fragmentation and incoherencies triggered by minimum harmonization rule
making in the implementation of directives. Moreover, the CFR aims to provide
both European and national judges with uniform principles for interpreting
European contract law, as a remedy to the diverse interpretation by domestic
courts.56 The institutionalization of the common frame of reference is developing
day by day and it can be monitored on the Commission website where the names
of the new appointees from the Member States are now made public.
The CFR project has divided scholars into two opposite camps supporting
and opposing the Commission agenda. On the Commission side, Christian Von
Bar maintained that the CFR is an important tool for establishing coherence of
European contract law.58 Likewise, the Acquis Group claimed that its ability to
provide a common terminology as well as common principles to interpret the
body of contract rules would be key to fostering coherency in European Contract

5

Case C-168/00, Leitner Simone v. TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co.KG, 2002 E.C.R. 1-2631, 40

C.M.L.R. 4, 937-952 (2002).
56 See The way forward, supra note 50, at 11 clarifying " The structure
envisage for the CFR is
that it would first set out common fundamental principles of contract law including guidance on
when exceptions to such fundamental principles could be required. Secondly, those fundamental
principles would be supported by definitions of key concepts. Thirdly, these principles and
definitions would be completed by model rules, forming the bulk of the CRF".
5
See the European Commission website on the European Frame of Reference at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consint/safeshop/fair buspract/cont law/common frame ref en
.htm.
58 See Christian Von Bar and Stephen Swann, A Response to the Action Plan, ERPL 3: 21537(2003) and Von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospectsfor EuropeanPrivate Law, 9
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW (2002), 379.
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law.59 In going beyond a mere functional approach, for which the CFR is simply
an instrument to achieve better legislation for the internal market, the Acquis
group suggested that this tool could be used also by accession countries as a
guideline for implementing European law or by practitioners in interpreting
- * 60
directives and then transposing national provisions.
In contrast, jurists committed to the understanding of the practice of
contract law and its social implications harshly criticized the CFR.61 They
claimed that the CFR is a formalist, technocratic and exegetic enterprise launched
by the Commission in order to limit the social function of contract law spurring
from different national legal traditions. By dismissing the social practices
embedded in domestic legal regimes, the CFR could end up reinforcing
divergences instead of creating greater uniformity in European contract law. In
their view, the CFR promotes a uniform application of European contract law
62
opening the risk of even further technocratic integration.
3.

The Ideological Divide: Neo-liberalism versus Social Justice in European
Contract law

The scholarly debate on the CFR reflects the current division in European private
law scholarship, a division that we can roughly summarize as follows. Currently
one of the most important cleavages lies between neoliberal jurists championing
for contractual freedom against social justice advocates arguing for welfarist rules
within European contract law. This paragraph underlines not only these political
divisions but it also shows how legal forms within this debate play an ambiguous
role. Social justice advocates are sometime committed to soft law tools and other
times champion hard law approaches.6 3 Similarly neoliberal lawyers at time
advocate for uniform standards and more often for soft legal tools. An example of
this ideological divide pervades the way jurists have been analysing the
contradictions in the text of the European Unfair Terms Directive adopted by the
European Council in 1993.64
Neoliberal jurists have claimed that European contract law was a
"constitutive element" of the internal market, one that enhanced its functioning
mechanisms by designating the rules of the game. The harmonization of contract
law contributed to strengthening the single market by ensuring a level playing
See Acquis Group at http://www.acquis-group.org/index.html; G. Ajani and H. Schulte-N6lke,
The Action Plan on a more coherent European contract Law: response on behalf of the Acquis
Group (2003).
60 See Ajani and Schulte- N6lke, supra
at 2.
61 See Social Justice Manifesto,
supra note 4.
62 Id; Hugh Collins, Editorial: The Future ofEuropean Private Law:
An Introduction, 10 EUR. L.
J. 645, 649 (2004).
63 See supra, note
39.
64 See Unfair Tenns directive, supra
note 10.
5
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field that enhanced individual freedoms. In supporting the harmonizing agenda of
the Principles of Contract Law,6 5 these jurists emphasized that the harmonization
of contract law could provide greater information to private actors and enhance
their private autonomy. 66 In supporting the idea of a European economic
constitution, they argued in favour of a European codification, which guaranteed
to each person the disposition of her individual entitlements. Jurgen Basedow
maintained that the notion of freedom of contract remained the core idea for a
European codification since every individual has the right to affirm his will to
enter into a binding contract. In his view, European codification strengthened
economic freedoms and counterbalanced the growing importance of consumer
regulation that undermined those common values enshrined in the notion of
67
contractual freedom. For these lawyers the scope of market harmonization was
to remedy the market failure created by the cleavage between commercial and
non-commercial contractual regimes, which restricted market competition and
created informational asymmetry.68 These lawyers have tied claims for European
codification69 to a notion of contract law as a tool for enhancing party autonomy
across Member States. 0
These neoliberal lawyers have devoted great attention to and supported
legislative measures proposed by the Commission. However, they have
highlighted that Community action should be cautious not to undermine its
democratic legitimacy, which is guaranteed by European procedures and mostly
by national democratic processes. 1 For instance, the Community cannot take
away individual rights from European citizens that the Treaty has conferred upon
See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW. PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando and
Hugh Beale eds.,
2000), for a comment see MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON
65

THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE at 112-13 (2002).
66 See PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION

IN THE INTERNAL MARKET

(Grundmann, Kerber and Weatherill eds., 2001).
67 See Jirgen Basedow, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The making of a
Hybrid, 1 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 3 5-49 (2001). Along this line see "The freedom to bind oneself
contractually to a future disposition is an important and striking example of this freedom". The
role of contract law "is based upon the theoretical perception that a promise and the reliance on it
is a basic behavior in human society" at 37.
68 See Stefan Grundmann, The Structure ofEuropean ContractLaw,
4 ERPL 505, 518 (2001).
69 See Jirgen Basedow, A Common ContractLaw for the Common Market,
33 CMLR 1169-1195
(1996).
71 See GRUNDMANN AND STUYCK, AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW
(2003).
71 See Brummer v. European Union Treaty, BverfGE 89, 155 (October,
12 1993) translated in
English at 1 C.M.L.R. 57 and the contrasting comments by Joseph H. Weiler, The State "ilber
alles."
Demos,
Telos
and
the
German
Maastricht
Decision
at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/jeamno/p0132.html and Peter Lindseth, The MaastrichtDecision Ten
Years Later: ParliamentaryDemocracy, Separation of Powers and the Schmittian Interpretation
Reconsidered at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/03_18.pdf.
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them.7 2 In casting light on the procedural guarantees of EC law, they advocated
for a European codification in tune with the functioning of the single market and
for legislative discretion by supranational institutions. These jurists often share a
common intellectual tradition, which can be traced back to the Freiburg ordoliberal school, which goes also under the rubric of German neo-liberalism,7 3
founded in the 1930s. In drawing on the ordo-liberal intellectual tradition they
traced back the meaning of notions such as contractual freedom to the post WWII
economic compromise of the German social-market economy. The ordo-liberal
tradition offered to the integration project an influential model of legitimation
through the notion of the "economic constitution". In relying on the central
tenets of the ordo-liberal tradition, jurists perceive the European economic
constitution enshrined in the Treaty as a means to ensure greater individual
autonomy within the internal market. In arguing in favor of a European
codification, they are attempting to provide a framework of general contract rules
that will ensure equal possibilities to all players in a free market and create a
system of undistorted competition.
In the late 1980s the Commission was in search of a model for drafting the
future Unfair Terms Directive.7 6 The Commission relied to a great extent on the
German law regulating unfair contract terms. The AGBG (Gesetz zur Regelung
des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen) was adopted in 1976 by the
Federal German Republic to regulate standard forms agreements. The AGBG
aimed to achieve a fair balance between conflicting interests in order to provide a
level playing field for private actors and reinvigorate the principle of freedom of
contract. The AGBG already contained all those rules that characterize the
unfair terms directive adopted in 1993, such as the principle of good faith and the
black list of unfair clauses. Most interestingly, it included a preliminary exception
that excluded the application of both provisions when there was an individual
agreement over a contract. The AGBG was adopted as a provision intended to
regulate economic transactions between industry and consumers and aimed at
72

See Ernst-Joachim Mestmdicker On the Legitimacy ofEuropean Law, RABELS ZEIT. 58, 615-635

(1994).
73 See V. J.VANBERG, THE CONSTITUTION OF MARKETS: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, at 37

(2001).
7 See MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE, THE COURT (2000).

See Christian Joerges, What is Left of the European Economic Constitution, Jean Monnet Paper
(EUI 2004) at 12; see alsoDavid Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neoliberalism, Competition Law and the "New " Europe, 42 AM. J. OF Comp. L, 25 (1994) and KERRY
RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING at 112 (2002).
76 See Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 10.
7 See LUDWIG RAISER, DAS RECHT DER ALLGEMEINEN GASCHAFTBENDINGUNGEN (1935). For a
comparative overview see Umberto Morello, Condizioni Generali di Contratto, in DIGESTO DELLE
DISCIPLINE CIVILISTICHE at 357 (2001).
7
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giving greater certainty to a consistent body of jurisprudence. German scholars
had long advocated for policing the imbalances and inequalities in adhesion
contracts. In particular, the AGBG is associated with Ludwig Raiser, one of the
prominent private lawyers in post-WWII Germany. Reiser was committed to the
creation of a liberal constitutional paradigm reconstructing the relation between
'78
the law, societal values and the economy.
However, the Unfair Terms Directive triggered a lot of discontent for a
number of reasons. Those neoliberal jurists who were no longer committed to
harmonization per se but began adopting a law and economics approach to
contract rules while appreciating the competitive advantages in soft legal regime
claimed that by policing the unfairness of contracts, the directive had been
"abused" because it created more stringent provisions than the ones contained in
the German AGB-Gesesetz. They argued that courts have gained disproportionate
power through the black list of unfair terms adopted by the directive since they
can void those contract terms they consider unfair. As Roberto Pardolesi
highlighted, from an economic perspective the paradox is that in declaring the
terms void judges cannot consider the price of the contract or of the term since
this is expressly left out from the realm of the directive.
In adopting United
States mainstream law and economics insights, neoliberal jurists attacked welfare
provisions contained in European directives.80 They deployed public choice
rationales to undermine the goals of the unfair terms directive, which "may cause
inefficiencies rather then curing them".81 In drawing on mainstream law and
economics insights, they argued that although the directive aimed to protect
consumers against unfairness, in reality it raised potential causes for
inefficiencies, thus creating negative welfare implications.82
The Unfair Terms directive also received sharp critiques from those jurists
advocating for a welfarist approach to private law and distributive justice in
contract law. These scholars argued that contract law should abandon a procedural

78

See LUDWIG RAISER,

IL COMPITO DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO (1990).

See Roberto Pardolesi, Clausole Abusive (nei contratti con i consumatori) Una direttiva
abusata?II Foro Italiano, 137-152, at 150 (March 1994).
80 For a definition of United States mainstream law and economics see Duncan Kennedy, supra at
79

17. In European private law see Roberto Pardolesi Clausole abusive, pardon vessatorie: verso
l'attuazione di una direttiva abusata, in CARDOZO ELECTRONIC LAW BULLETIN, 1995
www.gelso.unitn.it/card-adm/Review/Review.html attacking the unfair contract terms directive
and its "shocking black list of standard forms whose common thread is to shift risks from sellers to
buyers."
81 See See Roger Van den Bergh, Forced Harmonization of Contract Law in Europe, Not to be
Continued in S. GRUNDMANN, J. STUYCK, AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW, at 249 (2002).
82 Peter Van Wijck and Jules Theeuwes, Protection against Unfair Contracts: An Economic
Analysis ofEuropean Contract law, 9 EUR..J.L. ECON.:73 (2000).
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conception of justice and move towards a substantive one.8 3 If the notion of
procedural justice entailed the protection of individual rights and market
efficiency, they favored a substantive notion of justice in order to achieve an
"acceptable pattern of welfare" with fair distributive results. 4 Moreover their
skepticism towards the EC harmonization agenda contributed to their bias toward
hard or uniform legislative tools ad the European level, while favoring soft and
flexible tools of regulation.
For instance, when analyzing the Unfair Terms directive, social justice
advocates began challenging the harmonization of contract law as widely driven
by market rationality rather than consumer protection.85 Their criticisms focused
on the over-emphasis of the directive on internal market as the primary reason for
justifying the harmonization of unfair contract terms. 86 For example, the preamble
of the directive highlighted that divergence among national consumer regulations
would create a risk of distorting competition. The justification for the directive
was the need to enhance competition in products and services across Member
States, rather than the need to develop regulations that reflect contractual
realities. Finally, the directive did not touch upon individually negotiated terms
nor did it address provisions regarding the contract price.88
According to social justice advocates the Community leit-motif in drafting
the directive rested on a market efficiency rationale, which aimed to expand
consumer choice. They pointed out that the directive described buyers shopping
for their best contractual terms across Member States and assumed that consumers
would be better off through greater competition among contractual terms. They
remarked that the Commission assumed consumers to be actively involved in

83

See Hugh Collins, Distributive Justice through Contracts, 45 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 49

(1992).
See H.COLLINS, D.CAMPBELL AND J.WIGHTMAN, IMPLICIT DIMENSION OF CONTRACT, at 11
(2003).
8

See Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European contract law 14 O.J.L.S. 229 (1994).
The Recitals in the Preamble of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive focus predominantly on the
need to develop the single market and establish harmonized ground rules. See Recitals 1, 2, 3 and
5, 6, 7 and 8. This was a way to justify the legal basis adopted by the directive emanating from EC
Treaty art. 95, the provision governing the harmonization of the internal market
An analysis of the Preamble makes it clearly evident that the internal market is the priority. See
Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 4, at 235, where he highlights the lack of emphasis in the
Preamble to the Directive on the actual consumer contracting process.
8 See Unfair Contract Terms Directive, Article 4(2) "the fairness of the transaction in the sense of
the price paid for the goods or services should not be subjected to review control." In Hugh
Collins's view this obscure provision of the directive, by requiring clarity more than fairness,
demonstrates how EC contract law is intended for consumer choice and not for consumer rights,
see Hugh Collins, supra note 103, at 237.
85

86
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gathering and using information to make their decisions.8 9 The directive enlisted
contract law as a market-perfecting device, through which properly informed
consumers could police unfair terms.90
When explaining the stakes of harmonization, jurists put forward three
different thesis that share a skeptical view on the European constitutional
arrangement: national resistance, subsidiarity and cultural difference. The
resistance thesis focuses on the reactions of national legal regimes to the
implementation of European directives. 9 1 According to this view, the problem of
the harmonization of contract law related to the implementation of directives in
Member States legal orders, often represented by national civil codes. The
different outcomes of the Italian, German and French legal regimes in
implementing the Unfair Terms Directive revealed not only the difficulty in
harmonizing contract rules but also how little national contract laws were
harmonized in practice.92 Daniela Caruso claimed that the attempt of the
Commission to reform private law through directives has actually engaged state
legislators and national courts in resistance against the Europeanization process.9 3
The subsidiarity thesis, based on the principle introduced by the Maastricht
94
Treaty, focuses on the social dimension of contract law as being inherently
national and therefore culturally diverse. Some jurists claimed that contract law
couldn't rely on abstract general principles that Europeanization brings with it. 95
They argued that the Commission should make greater use of the subsidiarity
principle allowing Member States to regulate their contract law regimes
differently. The subsidiarity thesis has advanced the view that national contract
See generally STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY
(1997); HOWELLS G. AND WILHELMSSON, EC CONSUMER LAW (1997).
90 See Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, supra note 85 at 237. As Collins
puts it, there is the consumerist movement which "has percolated into the organs of the EC."
91 See Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of
EuropeanLegal Integration,supra note 42.
92 See Id. at 104. Daniela Caruso shows how the Unfair Contract
Terms directive struggled in its
reception by national legal orders. In particular the Product Liability Directive of 1985 was a big
disappointment since Member States took enormous delays in its implementation.
89

93

See Id.

94 See the subsidiarity principle, art. 5 (ex 3B) TEC: "In areas which do not fall within its

exclusive Competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community". This article provides a procedural approach to
determining issues of subsidiarity, rather than substantive criteria to apply. See George A.
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United
States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994) and G. de Burca,
95 See Hugh Collins, Transaction Costs and Subsidiarity In European Contract Law, in AN
ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, at 280 (Stefan Grundmann and Jules
Stuyck eds., 2003).
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law is shot-through with distributive concerns, which are now threatened from
above by European market integration. According to this thesis, Europeanization
is a formalist process that is suppressing diversity as an obstacle to free trade
while it undermines the distributive capacity of national contract law. 96
Some jurists have advanced a third thesis based on the notion of cultural
difference. In highly valuing the cultural diversity among national legal regimes,
they demonstrated skepticism about the possibilities of the harmonization process.
979 9 8
Drawing on sociological,9 7 cultural,
and linguistic9 insights, these scholars were
skeptical of the unification of private law regimes, which happened more at the
level of declamations than at the level of operative rules. In their view, the
harmonization of contract law erased European identities and offered a troubling
systematization of contract law without attempting to tackle the fragmentation of
legal contexts and the dilemmas of the welfare state.100 Scholars adopting the
cultural difference thesis generally argued against Europeanization as a formalist
threat to preserving the cultural tradition inherent in local or national contract law
regimes.101 In contrast to the various soft approaches, a new slogan proposed in
2002 was "Hard Code now!" 102
4.

The Social Justice Manifesto and the Legitimacy of the Process

In 2004, a number of jurists advocating for social justice in European private law
drafted a Manifesto to address the concerns of citizens about a European civil
code "as an expression of cultural identity and a scheme of social justice for a
market order." 103 In their intellectual enterprise, these jurists embraced the idea
that the new European legal culture offers a possibility to escape from the
formalism of private law regimes, allowing for a more open and frank dialogue on
the political and social stakes of the Europeanization process.10 4 In sharing a
realist understanding of contract law, they drafted a Social Justice Manifesto to
Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European contractlaw, supra note 85.
97 Gunter Teubner, Legal Irritants:Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in
New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
98 Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996).
99 See LES MULTIPLES LANGUES DU DROIT (Rodolfo Sacco ed., 2001).
100See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Welfare State Expectations, Privatizationand Private Law in FROM
96

DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATIZATION AND PRIVATE LAW

(T.Wilhelmsson and M. Hurri eds., 1998).
101 Pierre Legrand, La Legon d'Apollinairein C. JAMIN AND D. MAZEAUD, L'HARMONIZATION DU
DROIT DES CONTRATS EN EUROPE, at 37 (2003).
102 See Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1 (2002) for whom a
European Code will benefit consumers, avoiding soft law measures as the product of
corporate interests.
103 See Social Justice Manifesto, supra note
4 at 655.
14 See MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL
CULTURE (2001).
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oppose the notion that drafting a civil code should be a "technical problem to
10 5
overcome by experts."o
Rather than a technocratic enterprise based on neutral principles such as
freedom of contract, Social Justice advocates envisaged European contract law as
a set of doctrinal rules chosen to advance fairness and distributive justice.106 They
emphasized that the harmonization of contract law needs to be understood as part
of European multi-level governance creating political consequences for citizens of
the Union rather than merely a tool functional to the completion of the internal
market. In opposing a technocratic approach to harmonization, they departed from
those suggesting resisting harmonization of contract law because the European
level is pervaded by a constitutional asymmetry.
Thus Social Justice advocates claimed that the unification of private law
proceeds as part of the political evolution of the construction of the European
Union. Therefore the Commission should address socio-economic values more
openly and democratically through "new methods for the construction of this
union of shared fundamental values (which include respect for cultural diversity)
as represented in the law of contract and the remainder of private law." 10 7 Finally,
in their plea for greater social justice and regulatory legitimacy they maintain:
"Unless a more democratic and accountable process
is initiated, there is a clear danger that these
fundamental issues will never be openly addressed,
and a serious risk that powerful interest groups will
be able to manipulate the technocratic process
behind the scenes in order to secure their interests at
the expense of the welfare of ordinary citizens."
The Manifesto starts from the assumption that the Commission, in its
regulatory agenda, lacks a vision of fairness, because "[a]s traditionally
understood, the function of the European Community is to promote a free market,
not to ensure that this market is corrected in the light of distributive aims."1os The

three ideas around which the Manifesto unfolds are fairness in contractual
relations, the constitutionalization of private law and the legitimacy of European
modes of governance. As to the notion of fairness and the distributive effects of
contract rules the Manifesto suggests following the examples of national private
law systems, in which the protection is based "upon social needs rather than equal
15

See Hugh Collins, Editorial: the Future of European Private Law: An Introduction, 10 EUR.

L.J. 6, 650 (2004);
106

See HUGH

Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 2, at 655.

COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999).

107 See Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 2, at 657.
10s Id. at 662.
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opportunities, or a concern about the distributive consequences of legal rules
between groups, such as creditors and debtors, and equally importantly, within
such groups."109
While the neo-liberal agenda fosters clearly conservative goals, one may
also criticize from the left the Social Justice Manifesto. For instance, the
Manifesto emphasizes the need of procedural legitimacy -understood as a more
democratic and participatory processes for European decision-making- in the
construction of European private law. While legitimacy is certainly a necessary
condition for reaching social justice through the law, one might doubt that it is
sufficient. A process can be politically legitimate but lead to anti-social outcomes,
should for example, a conservative ideological platform take over in the political
process. Despite this possibility, the political choice to intervene in the landscape
of European law with any reform proposal capable of handling (paradoxically
even to choose) the current neo-liberal drift is welcome as a frontal challenge to
the phenomenon of naturalization of the status quo typical of the post-modern
condition. 110
The Manifesto however has only mildly challenged the most influential
part of the lawyer's profession, which has a stake in the current equilibrium of
power by controlling the lion's share of the European funding to scholarly
projects. Not surprisingly a few months after the publication of the Manifesto
some of its authors have themselves obtained rewarding sums from the
Commission to carry on social justice work while keeping participating in the
Von Bar group. This multiple role played by elite academics is indeed a recurrent
pattern within the social structure of European private law. As a consequence
European private law scholarships is characterized by both the fragmentation of
scholarly groups and the formation of grand coalitions pulled together for
instrumental purposes, thus creating the phenomenon that we call the Scholarly
Industry."
5.

The Scholarly Industry and its Dark Sides

It is now worth devoting a few thoughts to European academic legal scholarship,
a very important component of the patchwork of European private law in the
making. As it is well known, legal scholarship has played a pivotal role through
the history of European private law at least since the renaissance of legal studies

109

Id. at 666.
110 See the" naturalization effect" in adjudication in DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (1997).
...For a brilliant analysis on this subject by an anthropologist assessing the economic and
symbolic power of each group within the field of European private law, Agnes Schreiner, The
Common Core of Trento, A Socio-legal Analysis of a Research Project on European Private law,
at 125-140 in A. JETTINGHOFF AND H. SCHEPEL, IN LAWYERS' CIRCLES (2004).
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in Bologna early in the eleventh century. Comparativists have observed that in the
Western Legal Tradition academic scholars thrive and blossom as "hidden law
givers" 11 2 particularly in times in which the official authority of law is declining
or where the law presents itself as divided and in need of some rationalization. In
the United States, Justice Cardozo noticed a similar phenomenon when he
observed in the nineteen twenties that "the perplexity of the judge becomes the
scholar's opportunity." 1 1 3 It is no surprise, therefore, that the highly complex
relationship between official producers of private law in present day Europe
would produce such an opportunity that some European academics would quickly
seize.
Elsewhere, we have described the variety of "professional projects"
that
might have motivated the academics that have taken a critical position towards
European codification, an issue that we do not wish to re-open here. 1 We are
now interested in moving a step forward by observing a more pervasive
phenomenon that can be better understood as the role of the bourgeois European
legal academia in the production of the ideological component of an hegemonic
project. Building on Gui Debord, 1 16 one can observe that in the production of the
"spectacle" (or, if we prefer, an aesthetic of European private law) determining
the limits of acceptable discourses,11 7 both the authorities participating in its
construction and those that became authorities of its critique, play a similar role.
Consequently what we are observing is independent from the euro-friendly or
euro-skeptical positions of the different legal scholars active in the field. Both
groups share a belief in the culturally-legitimized and thus respectable, and even
desirable, nature of professionalized private law, thus regarding the Western
Legal Tradition as a cultural path and as a domain of knowledge of which
Europeans should be proud. If, to the contrary, one observes for just a moment,
European private law as a "social practice" (or better as an aggregate of social
practices) belonging to a dominating social class and serving, by the building of
an ideological superstructure, the economic base of current (European) capitalism,
See Antonio Gambaro, II Successo del giurista, II Foro Italiano (1983); see also
J.P. Dawson,
The Oracles of the Law (1968).
113 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(Yale University Press
1921).
114 See MAGALI SARFATTI-LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(Univ. of Cal. Press 1979).
115 See UGO MATTEL, THE EUROPEAN CODIFICATION PROCESS: CUT AND PASTE
(Int'l Law Publ'n
2003).
116 See GUY DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE (Donald
Nicholson-Smith, trans., Zone
Books 1995) (1968).
11 See Pierre Shlag, The Aesthetics ofAmerican Law, 115 HARV. L. REv 1047 (2002). but more
critical in a vein symilar to that of this paper, Haether Huges, Aestetics of Commercial Law.
Domestic and InternationalImplications forthcoming.
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the attitude towards its desirability is bound to change. One then should then see
European private law today (thus letting aside its more general historical role in
Western imperialism and plunder) largely as the product of an anti-law
movement, aimed at dismantling the concession that through time the law has
been compelled to grant to subordinate classes at the advantage of an outright
return to a "far west" or unregulated market behavior.
Such an anti-law movement is at play, produced by exactly the same global
actors, both in the United States and in Europe (and the other periphery). Clearly
its effectiveness in de-civilizing the law is in direct proportion to the weakness of
the formal and informal institutional background in which it operates and the
resistance that it is likely to find in the institutional setting.118 In the United States,
the anti-law movement is busy, among many other things, preaching for the
lowered punitive damages, the reduction of the role of the civil jury. It is also
behind the construction of the law and economic and ADR scholarly industries. 119
The strategy, exposed by Laura Nader in her ground-breaking work on
"harmony ideology," works as follows: an idea, loaded with positive meaning is
identified which may be a good cure for a social problem. We do not need to
spend time here on the issue of whether the "lack" that the idea is attempting to
cure is real or invented. 120 The example discussed by Nader was that of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, but there are a variety of others, such as, for
example, the idea of "development", that of "international human rights" or that
of "efficiency." Such ideas are usually broad, vague and difficult to challenge:
who would argue against the fact that justice should be easily available, that poor
countries should be made better off, that human rights should be respected, that it
is better to organize something in an efficient way or, by the same token, that one
should love mom? Around that idea an intellectual movement of scholars
producing work in the area is identified by useful promoters of that idea as an
ideology serving a hegemonic project. Their work is consequently encouraged,
promoted to mainstream status by the usual patterns of academic prestige, and
directly or indirectly funded. Usually the phenomenon does not remain at the
academic level; rather, the scholarly work organized and institutionalized as an
industry get used by a variety of policy functions. The industry thus grows,
develops its patterns of prestige and leadership, its canon, its aesthetics, its foes
and its friends. Nader has shown the phenomenon in the birth of the ADR
industry, promoted as a challenge to the civil rights movement in the late sixties,
In the sense used by DOUGLASS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge

C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
Univ. Press 1990).
119 See LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW (2001)
120 For example, the litigation explosion that originated the ADR frenzy in the US has been largely
invented. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (19861987).
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and now powerfully at play through the world. It is quite easy to see the birth and
flourishing of an International Human Rights industry, promoted and organized
by Western NGO's, highly instrumental in the construction of non-western
inferiority and in the ethnocentric promotion of Western values in such things as
gender relationship or family arrangements. Similarly law and development,
started as an industry during the cold war, has declined but is now back on its feet,
again playing a significant anti-law role in its participation to the Washington
consensus version. 121
One of these authors has identified the development of an "industry" in the
transformations of the "Law & Economics" movement, now pivotal in the policymaking of the International Financial Institutions. 1 2 2 Some of its mainstream antilaw work, attempting to limit the bite of punitive damages, is now financed
openly and shamelessly, by gross polluters such as the Exxon Corporation. 12 3
This scholarly industry, extremely powerful and well funded in the U.S. and
abroad, de-legitimizes the role of the law as a tool of control and constraint to free
market activity. Moreover, it aims to capture political and legislative processes
under the claim of neutral and efficient rules, improving wealth maximization in
market economies. 124
Once a scholarly industry is organized and promoted in the law, the
individual academic active in the field of inquiry occupied by the industry is
irresistibly attracted to it. Being internal to the industry offers career and
consulting opportunities for oneself and for his or her students and even the policy
perspectives stemming from it are attractive for the true believers and insiders.
They thus develop loyalties and in little time radical critiques and exposing mode
are marginalized and silenced. True, bourgeois academic industries pride
themselves of being open and pluralistic. Scholars are not censored. Rather they
tend to self-censor. The industry becomes itself a strong "cultural" support for
projects of hegemony and domination, and within the industry the fundamental
conception of the law as a civilizing device capable of promoting order and
freedom is part of the social contract. Truly anti-spectacular critiques stemming
121

See La Porta, R., L6pez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1998) Law and Finance,

Journal of Political Economy, 106: 1113-1155 and La Porta, R., L6pez de Silanes, F., and Shleifer,
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122 See Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics:
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Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 220 (2005); see also
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See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REV. 713, 748-52 (1996).
124 See Jon Hanson and David Josifon, The Situation: An Introduction To The Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, And Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129
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from a perception of law as a superstructure, to be resisted as the oppressive
capitalistic domination that produces it, are perhaps received raising more than
one eyebrow. Usually they fall short of reaching the mainstream channels of
scholarly communication, the most prestigious publishers, the leading journals.
These venues are dominated by "true" insiders and the rejecting letters will
always be on truly "objective" scholarly standards. Most of the time the industry
is even able to organize the resistance, in a display of methodological pluralism in
the best tradition of the post-modern identity thus occasional critical work might
see the light. Nevertheless, if ever critical ideas are published, the books are not
promoted and perhaps not reviewed. Insiders to the industry do not like to
confront "radical" questions. Harmony has to be preserved. Troublemakers are
not welcome.
European private law, much like law and Economics in the United States,
today is an industry. It fully participates in what is the truly dangerous radical
anti-law movement not just that of a few scholars concerned with equality,
struggling for social justice and political transformation. The real anti-law
movement today is promoted and supported, by the corporate domination of
public spaces. Scholarly industries, determining the space of acceptable speech,
contribute in this process of de-legitimization of the traditional political tools
potentially capable of being used to control economic processes: the positive law
produced by sovereign States. The industry of European private law shares with
that of Law and Economics (and with the other industries glanced above) its
crusade against the political-based production of law. Anti-positivism turns into
anti-state and anti-state into anti-law. The baby is thrown away with the
bathwater.
In the European Union, the political actors in the corporate anti-law
movement are the same as those in the United States, but the target and the means
are different. While the target are the Member State legal systems, with their
incremental development of institutional systems of "social" private law
(protective formalism, mandatory law, notarized acts, measures of contractual
justice such as the broad use of "unconscionability" or good faith) the mean is the
creation of another industry, the so-called new European private law. Because the
transformation of scholarly movements into industries precludes critical thinking,
the consequence of this move is the incapacity to set an independent agenda but
rather the desire to follow that of corporate-captured Brussels, in the hope of
obtaining funding and prestige. The emphasis on "contract" as the privileged tool
of the European private law process is no small part of such hegemonic agendal25
1255

An organization that has fluorished to this purpose is SECOLA, the Society for European
Contract Law that has been highly instrumental to the present focus on a contractarian vision of
the European legal landscape. See their site www.secola.org. Their most recent published effort is
S.Grundmann & D. Mazeaud, General Clauses and Standardsin European ContractLaw (2006).
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The "contractualization" of the legal and political spaces, in fact, has opened new
venues for neo-liberalism, suggesting a flexible order in which rights and secured
positions are abandoned to the market logic.
While both approaches have been saluted as widely needed challenges
against obsolete legal formalism and positivist approaches to legal reasoning, in
both contexts they ended up as an ideological legitimazion of the new global
legislators. In the United States efficiency functioned as the key element of
success of the anti-law movement by endorsing its neo-liberal policies. The
transformation of European private law scholarship into an industry has been a
successful strategy by which Brussels has both selected it neo-liberal allies
(Lando, Von Bar etc...) and has, so to say, "organized" the resistance.126 In fact,
the Commission founded a "network of excellence" by including together with its
neo-liberal expectations also some of the social justice concerns portrayed by the
Manifesto. 1 2 7 The Network of excellence has the task of drafting the Common
Frame of Reference in which the neo-liberal allies of the Commission have an
important role in driving the process.128
Many socially concerned scholars avoid asking fundamental questions such
as whether capitalism can be reformed incrementally, eventually leading to some
129
idealized state of sustainable development . Many of such scholars, perhaps
even believe that the private law system can play a role in this reform. They seem
oblivious to the fact that such a belief compels European law to follow an agenda
established by hegemonic actors, with no interest in legal civilization, but rather
with a clear agenda of dismantling what is left of it. We argue here that an
incremental transformation towards a progressive dimension in private law is
impossible (while perhaps a gradualist strategy cannot be excluded), that there is a
need of a frontal challenge, and that at least an independent leftist agenda should
be established.

See Ugo Mattei, Basic First Please! A Critique of Some Recent Prioritiesshown by the
Commission Action Plan, 297 in A. HARTKAMP ET AL., TOwARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE ( 2 nd
ed. 2004).
127 See Network of Excellence under the Sixth Framework
program of the EC.
128 See Martjin Hesselink, Capacity and Capability in European
contract law, 4 ERPL 491, 494
(2005).
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(2005).
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II.

Social contract law and Social Europe, part of the problem or part of
the solution?

1.

The "Social" Critique of Formalism in Contract Law and its historical
inadequacy

To be sure, the meaning of the word "social" in legal matters is much more
complex and endowed of a long and ambiguous pedigree in private law, than the
recent and quite feeble resurgence of a political sensitivity in the debate on
European private law would suggest. European private lawyers share the "Social"
intellectual tradition as a "vocabulary of legal concepts" that underwent a radical
shift at the beginning of the twentieth century. 1 3 0 Duncan Kennedy, himself
associated with the Social Justice Manifesto, nevertheless considers the "social"
as one of the very few general legal patterns that historically have been capable in
the past of characterizing a global way of thinking about the law.
Initially, the formalist or mid-nineteenth century approach to contract law
was rooted in Kantian philosophy and translated into private law by Savigny
through the notion of individual rights as forms of sovereignty "absolute within
their sphere". 1 3 1 Private individuals were guaranteed freedom from any
interference in the enjoyment of their private rights, which were protected by
means of an abuse of deductive reasoning.132
At the beginning of the twentieth century, some European scholars
elaborated a critique of contractual freedom to break with the nineteenth century
will-theory in contact law. 13 3 Their approach was based on the social and moral
perception that industrialization heightened existing economic disparities, which
created unfairness between contractual parties. According to Kennedy, after a first
wave of globalization of "classical" legal thought, beginning early in the twentieth
century a "social legal consciousness" became capable of globalization,
expanding its legal assumption well beyond the French and German academy
where, thanks to scholars such as Josserand or Gierke, it developed as a reaction
to the formalist thinking of the classical era. 1 34 For instance, Jhering's critique of
130 See Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizationsof law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 631, 635 (2003).
131 See FRANZ WIEACKER, STORIA DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO MODERNO (1967). This
conception of

individual rights is traced back to classical legal though of F.C. von Savigny. In case of conflict
between two individual rights, legal professors resolved the conflict by deducing a solution from

individual rights.
See Duncan Kennedy, supra note 119 (explaining the abuse of deduction in Classical Legal
Thought).
133 See Hugh Collins, The Voice of the Community,
4 EUR. L.J. 407 (1998).
134 See Duncan Kennedy, supra note 128. Kennedy
further posits that the social mode of thought,
132

which characterized the 1900-1950s, has recently yielded to a third globalization of
"americanized" legal thinking. This mode consists of a neo-formalist revival in the law, once more
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individual sovereignty brought into question the coherence of legal reasoning,
which was no longer as a matter of deductive interpretation but it was rooted in
mechanical social causes and moved by human ends. 13 5 In the beginning of the
twentieth century, some jurists elaborated an objective conception of contract law,
which is today a crucial legacy among private lawyers.136
If this social perspective on contract law has a multifaceted methodology
and it is politically ambivalent, there are at least two elements in its legal language
that traveled in time but have radically changed their meaning when developed by
the social consciousness at the beginning of the 1900s once translated in the
current European private law debate post-1950s.137
A first element of the vocabulary of the social is objectivism in contract
law. For "social" jurists, the unfairness resulting from the individualist doctrine of
freedom of contract can be corrected by an objective notion of contract, endorsing
altruistic values. A contract is no longer based on the subjective intention of the
parties, as an expression of their free will, but requires a limitation of contractual
freedom to fulfill the objective function of those transactions involving a plurality
of social and economic interests. In response to the rapid industrialization and the
growing interdependence of social reality in the beginning of the twentieth
century, the objective function of contract developed as a doctrine to address
inequalities in Western legal thought and to protect disadvantaged groups and
minorities through special legislations. 138 As a consequence, the doctrinal shift
still of relevance today is the move from a conception of absolute individual rights
to notions of abuse of rights and the limits of contractual freedom as a general
limitation of right based approaches.1 39
A second element of the vocabulary of the social in contract law is the
strategic invention of solidarity, which characterized the social economy of
understood as a merely technocratic artifact serving the needs of economic expansion rather than
those of human civilization and solidarity. In a sense, the "social" has been finally abandoned
while a mode of reasoning derived from the social, namely balancing between conflicting policies,
is still predominant in current legal thinking.
135 See RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR
LAW
136 See Duncan Kennedy, supra note 119, "The program

(1879).

of the Social: The social people had four
positive proposals: (a) from the social "is" to the adaptive ought for law, (b) from the deductive to
the instrumental approach to the formulation of nonns, (c) not only by the legislature but also by
legal scientists and judges and administrative agencies openly acknowledging gaps in the formally
valid order, (d) anchored in the normative practices ("living law") that groups intermediate
between the state and the individual were continuously developing in response to the needs of the
new interdependent social formation.
See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon
Fuller's "Considerationand Form", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000).
138 See FRANZ WIEACKER, supra note 131 at 289.
139 See Louis JOSSERAND, DE L'ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITE: THEORIE
DITE DE
137

L'ABUS DU DROIT

(1927), at 386.
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republican states struggling against conservative and revolutionary forces. 14 0 The
rise of organic solidarity in an increasingly specialized and interdependent society
informed the regulation of contract law. For instance, the housing sector after
WWI became a "coerced housing economy".
Because of the housing crisis in
Europe, governments intervened through rent control legislation that imposed
prices and protected tenants against landlords. When rent control regulations were
under attack all over Europe in the late 1970s, inducing fear that a regulatory gap
would emerge from their dismantlement, Wieacker highlighted that the legislator
could still circumvent the problem with a sort of "compensatory move", by
introducing a contract law regime which would make it more difficult to terminate
the rental contract or by creating subsidies for social housing.142
Today, well outside of the original historical context in which the social
unfolded in Europe and the United States, what is diffused in the new European
legal culture1 4 3 and the Manifesto might be nostalgia synonymous of a time
honored vocabulary which only reproduces parts or misunderstanding of it.144
What is needed today is thus a full updating of these seemingly critical notions to
the current vocabulary characterized by the challenges of economic liberalization
and a "third globalization" of legal thought.1 4 1
2.

The Critique of the Social and its erasure in the Manifesto

There are many possible lines of inquiry that show why the belief in a reasonable,
coherent and overall social approach in private law is no longer acceptable
without great skepticism. The Social Justice Manifesto has paid no attention to
these critiques with the unfortunate result of using the social as a positively loaded
notion. This essay provides three of them among many. First there is what
Duncan Kennedy inspired by European philosophers and sociologists, 146 has

140 See JAQUES DONZELOT,

L'INVENTION DU SOCIAL

(1984) (describing the influence on the social

by Emile Durkheim at 77 and the shift in the notion of an organic solidarity founded on the
division of labor which increases at the same time specialization and interdependence among
individuals), in EMILE DURKHEIM, LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL (1893).
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143 See Martijn W. Hesselink, The New European Private
Law (2002) at 170.
144 See Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National
Tradition in
Privatelaw, in MARTIJN W. HESSELINK ED., THE POLITICS OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (2006).
145 See Duncan Kennedy, supra note 132 (explaining that a third globalization
of legal thought is
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called the Death of Reason narrative which has pervaded European legal
consciousness since the middle of the twentieth century:
"[...] legal consciousness participates in an even more
general or abstract history of American thought that in turn
participates in a Western story of loss of faith. It is important that
loss of faith is something that happens as an event along a
rationalizing work path that transforms whatever discourse we are
talking about, so that we lose faith (or don't) in reason in a world
that has been transformed by reason, rationalized to the point of
arbitrariness, so to speak." 14 7
If the Social was a predominant mode of legal consciousness in Europe,
this also produced the seeds for its end. Through Weberian disenchantment
towards legal reasoning and its increasing rationalization "jurists reconcile with a
loss of faith narrative, which denies transcendence and coherence of formal legal
rationality while unmasking violence and coercion in the acceptance of legal
rules."" 8 Thus, rules embedded in the vocabulary and the institutional
imagination of the social can no longer provide unquestioned solutions. Rather,
the lack of balancing between conflicting interests behind each rule and the
unquestioned acceptance of a legal rule instead of an alternative one turns out to
be the very core of the inadequacy of a social contract law.
A second critique, addresses the skepticism towards welfarist legislation
that in the 1970s legal economists in Chicago articulated clearly and influenced
legal thought on both sides of the Atlantic. In their attempt to undermine the
possibility of social legislation and their unintended consequences, mainstream
legal economists defended the notion that welfare legislation was necessary
"hurting the people it was trying to help." In fact, through the increase in prices of
consumer goods, sellers could easily pass on the costs of a warranty to the
consumers. In this way, the beneficiaries of the warranty would be driven out
from the market. For instance, in addressing compulsory terms, which performed
an insurance-like function for buyers, mainstream law and economics scholars
argued that they created inefficient outcomes by diminishing overall consumer
welfare by creating higher prices. The warranty undermined the purpose of
reducing transaction costs through contracts of adhesion, while it made worse off
marginal groups of consumers that were priced out of the market. Thus, according
147 See Duncan Kennedy, supra note 135 at 98.
...Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment Of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, Or Max
Weber's Sociology In The Genealogy Of The Contemporary Mode Of Western Legal Thought, in
MAX
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Gorski, David M. Trubek eds., 2005).
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to these scholars, compulsory warranties in consumer contracts "run counter to
redistributive rationales" by creating non-optimal market results. 14 9
A third reason to be skeptical of the 'social' stems from the so-called
constitutional asymmetry theory. European institutions engaged in centralized
private-law reform have often supported the deregulatory process initiated in the
late 1970s by conservative national governments. For instance, the product
liability directive managed to lower the standards of protection for consumers in
several Member States, especially where these rules were not highly visible
because they were created through judicial lawmaking.1 50 From the viewpoint of
welfarist advocates, Member State autonomy is severely limited by the new
European legal order for the sake of achieving a fully integrated market, and
Europeanization threatens to dismantle national social provisions. Because of a
"constitutional asymmetry" pervading the EU, neither the Community decisionmaker, nor the Member States have the comprehensive regulatory capacity to
undertake a strategic compensatory move to implement reforms or create new
contract, administrative or criminal law rules. 151 Obviously, the faith in the social
loses much of its steam if one embraces the constitutional asymmetry theory.
These three lines of critical inquiry suggest departing from the vocabulary
of the social in private law. Rather, they strive to find answers to the critiques of
the social. Not only progressive projects should articulate these answers but they
ought to set aside the "contested concept" 1 5 2 of social values for their agenda, no
matter if social is accompanying words like justice, rights and modes of legal
consciousness, that are only contextually meaningful today. Most importantly, in
the European context one should give full consideration to the fact that the
Network of Excellence of scholars drafting the CFR has included "social justice"
into a hegemonic project, that of constructing the private law industry, that is part
of the third globalization or imperial Americanization of law. Further it is
mandatory to avoid confusing between the social as a scholarly notion intrinsic to
Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of non-substantive unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1063,
1058, 1067 (1977). The efficiency of standardized contract lies in its internal construction: Once
the seller pre-establishes the terms of the contract and the consumer is presented with a 'take it or
leave it' agreement. Both buyer and seller thereby avoid further transaction costs of negotiating
individual agreements while a legal rule restricting the enforceability of standardized contracts
creates large efficiency loss.
150 See Daniela Caruso, supra
note 42.
151 See Fernanda Nicola, Another View on European Integration: Distributive
Stakes in the
Harmonization of European Law, in C.DALTON AND D.DANIELSON, PROGRESSIVE LAWYERSING,
149
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331, 345 (2003).
152 Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in Private
Law, in Duncan Kennedy, , The Disenchantment of Legal Rationality, in THE POLITICS OF A
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Martijn W. Hesselink ed., 2006).
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private law and the social as a political essence of current Europe, something that
we turn to explore now.
3.

Social Europe: A Solution or a Competitive Hegemonic Project?

With the fall of the Soviet Union the international political field has been
constructed as an essentialized end of history. Socialist alternatives have been
largely erased (think about the experience of Cuba, or the more recent ones in
Venezuela or Bolivia), demonized (North Korea) or reconstructed in westerncapitalists terms (think about China). Non-socialist alternatives have been
relentlessly fought (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran...). Within the dominant West an
opposition, that between European social capitalism and Neo-American
capitalism has been introduced1 5 3 , emphasized 154 and accepted as a self-image of
many European moderate leftists.
European capitalism has been characterized by a much more social flavour
than its United States counterpart.15 5 Should European law be able to capture and
reflect in the rules of the game it sets forward some of the values comprised in the
"European social model", it might impose itself as a model capable of competing
with United States hegemony. Is that a desirable outcome seen from the left? Is a
model of gentle capitalism, based on a radically unequal pattern of resource
distribution (due to colonial accumulation and double standards in international
trade) what we should look forward to?
Across disciplines scholars have articulated the European identity in
opposition to the United States model of homologated capitalism. The EU stands
as a softer, more diverse and ultimately more social model of market
integration. 15 6 If the United States stands as a multiethnic melting pot pervaded by
racial and socio-economic segregation, the EU stands as a welfare regime, which
protects through rights-based and solidaristic multicultural claims its citizens, but
not its outsiders.15 7 We should be weary of such flawed oppositions that are aimed
to construct capitalism as a sustainable model of development provided some
moderate reforms of its most savage distortions are cured. The essence of
capitalism is much easier to perceive when it has its gloves off, and one of the
This opposition between Rehnan capitalism and Neo-American capitalism has been introduced
by the French Economist MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME (Seuil 1998).
153
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risks of the social aesthetics is exactly its working as an ideological device
masking a reality of hypocrisy, neo-colonialism and exploitation. No progressive
agenda should point at an alternative hegemonic model. Hegemony is what should
be relentlessly criticized and the real issue, on which it is hard to take side is
whether the law can serve or not, at least in transitional, anti-hegemonic purposes.
In departing from these competitive hegemonic views, from a progressive
political perspective the possibility of Social Europe is no more than a
compromise of realism, but it might at least be a first step in the gradualist
construction of a more civilized worldly legal landscape.15 8 A progressive agenda
ought to look for solutions by considering the variety of European social models
through the awareness that market outsiders, immigrants and those who have no
access to business transactions might be the first beneficiaries of Social Europe,
should a platform of opening it up become successful. Thus European integration
could be seen as a moderate redistributive exercise.
We will pose here only a few questions for discussion that have been
largely ignored by European private law serving the function of an industry. Our
goal is to tackle those preliminary issues that the scholarly debate should clarify to
make political choices possible. Institutions, should serve a purpose. Proposed
reforms and changes should create advantages and benefit for the community they
serve. The first question to pose is consequently whose interests the European
private law system has to serve? Is the European law only to serve the interests of
the Europeans? Alternatively, is Europe a sufficiently strong world power (both in
terms of economy and of culture) that its legal system can influence global
developments in the present moment of high uncertainty about what path we
should walk in the future of world capitalism? We submit that European private
lawyers should take full advantage of the cosmopolitan perspective stemming
from their more cosmopolitan background (which has proved to be a necessity
rather than a choice in present day's Europe) to think worldly, i.e. to imagine a
legal structure of the European market capable of working as a model and
consequently serve the global community and not merely the European interests.
European lawyers, if paralleled with their U.S. counterparts, have been
good comparativists but very poor economists and social scientists. This lack of
knowledge in other social sciences has for a long period of time closed European
lawyers (common lawyers as well as civilians) into a useless black letter style of
legal positivistic analysis that made them completely disregard the social and
economic impact of their legal constructions. Once the costs of legalism have
been understood, at least by some avant-garde (mostly of comparatvists) in a
relatively recent past, the poor conditions of the background understanding have
not ceased to play a negative role. In the efforts of their kempf against positivism
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and in the late and hasty discovery of the existence and virtues of the market,
many European lawyers (as well as a large number of policy makers throughout
the political spectrum) have trusted the virtues of an unregulated market much
more than what is in order. Rather than limiting and trimming regulation where
wasteful, European legal culture, similar to Law and Economics in the United
States, participated in surrendering the political process and its legitimated
production of binding rules of behaviour to unrestricted market practices only
softly regulated when regulated at all. This trend, to say the least, is based on bad
economics.
European policy-makers should not underestimate the potential major
impact of what happens today in Europe in the current lawless global corporate
marketplace. Many people in the world (including in the United States the many
discontents of the World bank and the IMF as global lawmakers) would welcome
a truly responsible piece of economic legislation, something that Europe owes to
humankind to make good its less than respectable exploitive past. A radically
reformed European legal system, prestigious because of the culture behind it,
could become, in the global world, a true model provided that mainstream
European intellectuals and policy makers stop now their self congratulatory
attitude stemming from an ideological construction of our tradition, as if Europe
were not in the past and in the present responsible for much suffering and strife in
the world. If, as a leading legal system, Europe begins to change its attitude
towards lawless capital globalisation in favour of a more progressive and
redistributive model of economic development, this could be a first move of
countertrend away from global hegemony and exploitation. 159
4.

Social Europe versus Socialist Europe.

Just like in using notions such as "the social" European private lawyers have
deployed a term which lost its contextual values and its most sophisticated legal
implications, similarly European scholars have plunged into European integration
and a "third globalization" with no awareness of their own path in the building of
a progressive legal regime. In the last fifteen years a lot has been written on the
fall of socialism in the former Soviet Union. A variety of explanations, more or
less self-congratulatory, have been advanced but no attempt has been made to
shed light on two aspects, both strictly connected, with the present state of
European private law. First, no attempt has been made to appraise the positive
contribution of socialist and communist scholars to private law in Europe,

See Steven Gill and David Law, Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital, 33
INT'L STUD. Q. 475 (1989).
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including such diverse experiences as the "Uso alternativo del diritto" 160 in the
Italian legal academy of the seventies and the East German Civil Code of 1975.161
These genuine and ambitious contributions to the development of a more
inclusive system of private law have been hastily and unfairly dismissed. Second,
no effort has been made to appraise the negative consequences for European law
of the fall of the Soviet block. Nevertheless, a clear appreciation of the impact of
the release of Cold War pressures on European law-makers after the symbolic fall
of the Berlin Wall is the indispensable context for any significant analysis of
social trends in European law today.
One can observe in general that private law in Europe, historically
unfolded remote from social concerns, the traditional domain of the public law in
the civilian taxonomy. Naturally, there have been a variety of early countertendencies in this mainstream attitude to consider wealth disparity and power
imbalance as irrelevant to private law. The rich debate on the so called "social
function" of rights that occupied the 1930s in Europe witnesses such wealth of
thought, spanning from the Second International to the Catholic solidaristic
tradition, even reaching some aspects of the so called "fascist conception" of
property law. 162 Even in the mainstream nevertheless, a political platform of
equality and an agenda of re-distribution of wealth, mostly but not only located in
the public law tradition, has characterized, with different degrees of intensity, the
first three quarters of the twentieth century. Such a platform, put at the center of
national political processes by the workers and trade union movements, stimulated
the growth of the Welfare State institutions, a more or less conscious strategic
concession of the industrial bourgeoisie to avoid anti-capitalist revolution. While
this social welfare has often been fiercely resisted both from the right (particularly
by the more reactionary and authoritarian industrialists) and from the left
(challenging social institutions as Foucaultian controlling processes), it is a fact
that the weak actors of society have received some material benefits from the birth
of welfare state institutions, with consequent increase of human civilization and
dignity.
In a number of countries where socialist and communist parties have been
able to survive the relentless persecution of Fascist regimes, reaching some degree
of power through the Cold War, some local legal scholarship has developed a
genuine social dimension, something far more advanced than the "third way"
See Pietro Barcellona (ed.) L' Uso alternativo del diritto. I Scienza Giuridica e analisi
Marxista (1973); id vol II Ortodossia giuridica e pratica politica (1973); see also Cesare Salvi
(ed.), CategorieGiuridiche e rapportisociali (1978).
161 It is therefore particularly important the initiative of Professor Luca Nivarra of the University
of Palermo (Italy) that has convened a conference on the legacy of the "seventies" in private law
for July 2006.
162 See K. Renner, Gli Istituti del Diritto Privato e la loro Funzione Sociale (It. transl. 1981); see
also David Kennedy, supra note.
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compromise reached in the mentioned Social Justice Manifesto. Consideration
should be given to the fact that the Welfare State and more generally the traits of
the so called European social (or Rhenan) capitalism developed together with a
variety of protective policies and within a strong role of the State into the Member
States economies which have been anathema to Brussels from the very beginning
of the European Common Market.
The market is healthy when in open competition with other institutions,
the legal system and the political process being the most significant.163 However
the common market should neither be ignored nor made the object of idolatry as
the accession in May 2004 signified for many of the new comers to Social Europe
in departing from their Socialist and undemocratic past.164 The market should be
regulated to the extent necessary to make all the actors pay for their social costs.
Such regulation, short from coming only from the public law and from ex-ante
government authorization, should be rooted in substantive private law rules
accessible to everybody and given bite by a variety of effective remedies. This
aspect introduces another crucial aspect of a progressive agenda.
The law in the West is an important aspect of the cultural identity of a
community. Europe is in desperate need of such an identity building exercise,
from the perspective of anybody who is interested in providing a viable
alternative to the present, unsustainable, pattern of capitalist development and
exploitation. Dismantling the social institutions of capitalism such as access to
law for the poor in favor of the return to a laissez faire philosophy (in the name of
market flexibility), as it consistently happened since the fall of the Cold War, is
not a necessity. It is only reactionary politics.
III.

Setting a Progressive Agenda in European Private Law

We shall now try to move a first step in the outline of a policy agenda for the
purpose of developing methodologies and strategies for a progressive model of
private law, radically breaking with the present, unchallenged trends in European
private law. Despite the fact that one of these authors has actually participated in
the drafting of the Social Justice manifesto, we believe that the time is ripe for a
thorough break with its moderate, half of the way, logic. In this light participation
in the drafting of the Manifesto back in 2003 should be seen as "gradualist"
strategy (in the sense developed among others by Togliatti as early as 1946) while
the time is now ripe for its frontal challenge. In a moment of unprecedented
acceleration, when government appointed members to the "common frame of
reference" are beginning to give institutional life to what only two years ago
163
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seemed only an ill conceived ideal6 5 , the construction of the European private law
industry (symbolized by the European Commission- funded creation of the
"network of excellence") requires radical critique and production of alternatives
now, before it is too late.
The setting of a new progressive (or if you prefer marxist\socialist) agenda
for European private law should start from the full exposure of the "third ways",
"end of history", "new labor" logic that dominates the Manifesto, which makes it
participate in the "harmonious" logic 1 66 of construction of the "inevitability" of
the current patterns of power disparity, both within the Union and outside of the
boarders of fortress Europe. By claiming a "social" exception to the neo-liberal
logic, and by making the "social" an alternative to the current model of neoliberal domination, the Manifesto blames the current state of affairs to the
technocratic way in which Brussels handles the issue. It moreover implies some
moral superiority of the European model of capitalism as opposed to the U.S. one,
an assumption that is entirely to be demonstrated and that only serves hiding a
higher level of political hypocrisy.
The European third way political logic of the Manifesto, just like the
dominant platform of the Democratic Party in the United States, are nothing more
than political superstructures in the present phase of global capitalism. They
cannot be distinguished among them in moral terms but should be critically
appreciated as political allies in maintaining the economic and social status quo
and, for what matters here, the system of private law as a tool of decentralized
domination rather than of cultural expression and liberation. This strategy of
pointing at the responsibilities of some extremes or exceptions, rather than
appreciating those of the dominating middle ground is particularly diffused in the
privileged social class of jurists who thrive in its business of granting principled
legitimization to inequality and exploitation. 167
Thus the current necessity on the legal left1 68 to face a line of questions
that Pietro Barcellona was posing more than thirty years ago and that need some
answers in the current transformative phase of European private law: "In what
conditions is it possible to be politically active while remaining jurists? What
political change is possible to reach with the tools of the law? What are the legal
tools that should be preferred in a perspective of (more or less radical)
transformation of society?" 169
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These questions point today even more than thirty years ago, at the
political necessity of a dramatic discontinuity in the settled balance of power in
the dialectic between private law as an agency of market oppression as opposed to
an agency of economic and political liberation.17 0 Given the present irresponsible
and destructive phase of capitalistic accumulation and development, this
intellectual break pointing at progressive alternatives and exploring them into
details, should happen sooner rather than later. This article should be seen also as
a plea to other "resisting" legal scholars and intellectuals to aggregate around a
construction of such alternatives based on a political platform alternative to the
moderate one of the Manifesto. At the moment, the social dimension of European
private law is almost an oxymoron, if not an alternative model of hegemony,
evoked as a aspiration more than as a political platform by a few concerned
scholars. Unfortunately, in the present phase, the social mode of European private
law only works as false consciousness, offering a degree of respectability to a
field, that of European private law, whose DNA is inherently subservient to the
requirements of global capitalism.
1.

Re-Politicizing the process

In an attempt to draft some priorities, a first requirement is that of humblety and a
sense of a limit. In general, jurists as such should not attempt to substitute
politicians in making choices impacting the general public, so that a first limit of
action, that of political legitimacy, as opposed to professionalism should be regained. Contrariwise, private lawyers should be aware and defiant of the
traditional limits of their own field. Private law is an institutional structure born in
Europe out of requirements of early capitalistic accumulation, itself functional to
the early imperial transformations of the Roman Republic and of Renaissance
colonialism. It is possibly the area of law most compromised with and intimately
related to capitalism, so that its anti-capitalistic and counter-hegemonic use is the
most problematic. In setting the agenda of a progressive legal and political
platform, therefore, private law jurists should stretch their reach to the boarders of
the traditional subject matter. We need, on the one hand, to reinstate the limits of
law as opposed to political action. But on the other hand we need to bluntly
overcome the limits of traditional private law as an agency facilitating
accumulation and exploitation, to occupy and integrate in the fundamental
structure of property rights (which certainly includes contracts and torts) those
more progressive areas dealing with individual welfare and rights of the lower
classes as opposed to the exploiting elites. What should be our attitude in front of
the ownership, individual or corporate, of means of production? What limits
should we set to economic rights and freedoms? Should we work out a full theory
This dialectic is explored in details in Ugo Mattei & Laura Nader, Plunder. Imperial Uses of
the Rule ofLaw, forthcoming.
17o
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of rights abuse able to confront arguments fearing the dictatorship of courts of
law? How can we civilize corporate behavior?
While we do not think that the decision on whether to attempt a
comprehensive reform of European private law (possibly inspired by values of
social justice) and the choice of values informing this reform should belong to
professionals, we believe that the legal left should work out detailed proposals on
issues such as the ones touched in the previous, incomplete, list of questions. The
decision of whether to change the law is a core business of the political process.
But the political process should be put in the position to evaluate technically
sustainable alternatives to avoid reproduction of the kind of mistakes that have
produced failures of socialist alternatives in a variety of political contexts.
True, in the quite short history of the European Union most major choices
have been carried on by technocrats and imposed over the people. Possibly the
creation of a Euro zone is the most important of those. Nevertheless, the lack of
participation in the adoption of EC legislation that is plaguing Europe and the
consequent resistance in the adoption of a European Constitution imposed from
the top down should not be seized by influential professional guilds (such as that
of academic lawyers) to claim privileges and powers that clearly do not belong to
them. The spirit of the European people and of the working class majority should
be able to emerge in a genuine popular constitutional effort in which the wind of
socialism might once more blow, if for no other reason because of the miserable
state of affairs produced by current neo-liberal trends. It is the province of
progressive jurists, to expose the contradictions of democracy double talk
disempowering the people by skilful use of ideology.
A master of progressive private law17 1 has already suggested the need to
appoint a politically responsible body to revise and suggest reforms in the domain
of private law, authoritatively developing a suggestion that one of us has also
hinted to sometime ago. 172 Struggling to obtain such a politically legitimized and
responsible body, perhaps on the model of the British Law Commission, looks
like an unavoidable pre-requisite to allow the socialist component of European
private law culture to impose its alternatives imperio rationis. Giving back the
political choices where they belong and taking them away from technocrats and
self appointed academics, certainly aids in understanding priorities. Moreover a
legitimate process will prevent that the mode of soft influence exercised by
corporate actors and will set the next agenda on European Private Law. One of the
most interesting (and dangerous) ways in which the agenda is set is by
transformation of otherwise critical modes of thought (as for example independent
scholarship on European private law) into organized, quasi political "industries",
Stefano Rodota', Il codice civile e ilprocesso costituente europeo, 23 RIv. CRIT. DIR. PRIV. 21
(2005).
172 See Ugo Mattei, The European CodificationProcess,
supra note 114.
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where scholars carry on a political platform, and develop stakes and loyalties to
their collective "accomplishment", abandoning any critical doubt whatsoever.
Martijn Hesselink has been one of the most prominent voices among the
moderate scholars of the Social Justice manifesto advocating for a repoliticisation of the process of adoption of a European contract code. 1 7 3 In looking
at the past difficulties in implementing private law directives Hesselink is
sceptical of the possibility of adopting by 2009 a comprehensive Common Frame
of Reference as the Commission aims to achieve.
However, in looking at the
example of the Dutch Civil code adopted in 1992 he suggested that the
Commission should submit, similarly to the Dutch commission in the 1950s, a list
of questions regarding the substance of the Common Frame of Reference to the
European Parliament. This has been one of the possible strategies proposed by
scholars to re-politicise the process of Europeanization of private law by making
it more public and less technical.
It is true that many of the issues to be faced in the "making" of private law
are of a somewhat "technical"1 75 nature, so the public understanding of their
political implications can be only limited. Nevertheless, it is extraordinarily
important for at least the scholarly and legal communities at large to be aware of
the fundamental political implications of the different options. This is particularly
crucial these days when a large variety of discourses and rhetorical devices are acritically imported from the United States either as trendy cultural movements, or
as self-serving solutions imposed or marketed by the all mighty transnational
economic actors together with their faithful servants-the mega-law firms and,
more generally the mainstream legal community.
But once the political dimension is understood --- and the Manifesto has
certainly been useful from this point of view--- the issue of the leftist political
agenda is entirely to be faced and, as we hope we have been able to explain, the
word "social" might well be more part of the problem than of the solution.
2.

Toward a Transformative Agenda for European Private Law

European private law has many lessons to learn from the past in order to
accomplish the challenges for the future and to be transformed for the purposes of
a progressive agenda. To begin with it is imperative to overcome the great abyss
between the common law and the civil law traditions in order to profitably learn
from both experiences. Reform should reflect contributions from all the legal
traditions of Europe, and we would suggest, also from those non-European
173
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traditions that a ripe community of legal scholars well grounded in comparative
law, might be understood as useful for the task of legal civilization. This is why,
in the domain of European private law, a progressive agenda should make al the
possible efforts to give voice to the traditionally recessive legal cultures, (the
Latin as well as all the new accessions), today plainly ignored or treated with
condescendence in all the so called "integrative" projects of European private law
k-176
making.
European legal scholarship (or science as once was said) should learn to
think more freely, should break the still present cages of formalism, should
challenge the established taxonomies and all the artificial boundaries like those
between private law and public law or between substantive and procedural law.
The task in front of us is to produce a restructured private law system capable of
becoming the milestone of twenty-first century social and political regulation of
market forces. We are in need of a regulation of market transactions capable of
making them serve the interest of everybody not only of strong economic actors
nor, of course Europeans only. Such an effort, which is clearly the province of an
inclusive leftist agenda, must be started before it is too late.
Many things that traditional formalist (particularly civilian) cages of
learning have precluded from being considered as top priorities in private law
should be approached and thoroughly explored. Remedies, access to justice,
environmental law, protection of diffused interests, fundamental antitrust
regulations and many other connected fields should all be thoroughly explored. A
process of socially concerned European law reform is an exercise of learning by
doing. It is however an exercise that needs to be done within a conscious political
plan to accomplish the result.
A minimalist effort should be to locate those fundamental principles that
can readily be used by courts to force market actors to internalise the social costs
that they produce and transfer on weaker actors. This is why limiting the focus on
contract law, as it is the trend legitimized by the Social Justice manifesto, is both a
mistake and a hegemonic strategy to be denounced. The outcome is to even more
openly shift private law to the service of global market capitalism.17 7
Even seen from the more conservative perspectives of social sciences, and
of economics in particular, private law is an integrated body of fundamental rules

This claim is developed in Opening Up European Private Law (M. Bussani
& U. Mattei eds.,
2006) For some information Christian Von Bar & Stephen Swann, Response to the Action Plan on
European ContractLaw: A More Coherent European Contract Law (Com 2003, 63), EUR. REV.
PRIVATE L. 595 (2003).
177 See M. Bussani, The ContractLaw Codification Project in Europe: Policies, Targets and Time
Dimensions, in AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAw (Grundman & Stuyk
eds., 2004)
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of the game 1. Contracts, torts, property, restitutions and corporation in this
perspective play a very similar role. They integrate and complete each other, as
private law rules introducing correct sets of incentives for a market place in which
the social costs are appropriately internalized. Variations in form might be
substantial. They are however the resultant of historical accidents (sometimes
promoted as legal culture but that could be described more critically as survivals
in the sociological tradition or path dependency in the economic one) that do not
change the fundamental substance1 7 9 . The truth of the matter is that taxonomy in
the law must only serve the purpose of organizing knowledge and should never be
seen as something determining the substantive solution to social problems. For
too many years European lawyers (again in the Continent as well as in the
common law) have been victims of the illusion that deducting (or inducing) rules
from taxonomy could be seen as a scientific exercise. Such formalistic exercise
has only been a waste of time but has many times guided ill-considered decisions.
For some years now a project known as The Common Core of European
Private Law has been carried on as a painstaking effort to understand how things
really are in European private law 8 0 . Our efforts have been conscious of the
many difficulties and epistemological objections that we were facing.
Nevertheless, our experience has been that taxonomy, is bound to become a cage
if any attempt is made to use it beyond its very minimal (but so important at the
same time) task of organizing materials. As long as the law contains a regime
comprehensive enough to force at least internalisation of social costs, any
taxonomy works. Alternatively, the purest taxonomy will contribute zero to
legality and legal civilization.
One important lesson that we can learn from social sciences and from the
most advanced approaches to legal scholarship is the importance of the dynamic
process, in the production of institutions as well as of technology and products.
The processes as well as the outcomes should attract the attention of scholars,
judges and legislators. Most of the externalities, most of the social costs dumped
in the backyard of our weaker neighbours of the south of the world, are created
during the process ofproduction of commodities that are vastly consumed by the
almost half billion people that make the European market.18 1 Such process of
production is traditionally simply ignored by private law, concerned as it is only
with the final outcomes. This state of affairs simply shows that European
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consumers pay too little for their commodities since their prices do not reflect the
true social costs of production (environment, labour exploitation, etc.) and
European capitalism is once again subsidized by former colonies. Moreover
multinational corporate logo-lords (mostly European and North American) make
unfair profits pocketing the value of such social cost. In both cases such economic
realities should be a concern for the European policymaker when busy drafting
the rules of the game. It is the duty of a progressive agenda to expose this lack of
attention. To be sure, we know that a large number of successful market
competitors on the European market offer an inefficiently high number of
products at an artificially low price. Such multinational competitors push out of
business smaller market actors. Smaller market actors do not externalise costs of
production on people in the south of the world. Usually by acting locally such
weaker actors have to comply with European standards of labour conditions and
environmental protection and, as a consequence, cannot supply as many
commodities at such law prices. Producer's liability, one of the frontiers in
European private law, only covers social costs imposed by the outcome of
productive process in the consumer's market. Indeed this is a small fraction of the
externalities problems that a system of private law that approaches problems
globally should tackle.
This basic change of perspective-from the outcome to the process - is
bound to lead to very important insights cutting across a significant section of the
substantive rules of the game. This perspective may, more than anything else, cure
the presently existing gap between substantive rules, remedies and procedures: a
plague that the civilian dogmatic attitude should not infect to the European legal
process. Focusing on processes as well as outcomes is likely to allow scholars,
policymakers, (and perhaps even the people!) to perceive the importance of the
stakes that are on the table.
A progressive European private law, for the time being, does not really
exist. In fact, such European private law can only stem from an ideological break
with the current phase in which Europe is a servant agency of global capitalism.
Such a revolutionary break requires an agenda, capable of spelling out priorities.
Any transformative agenda in European private law should begin with the
full disruption of the cages of formalist legal thinking that inhibit to people's
appreciation of the full domain of the legal possibility in the process of social
transformation and political decisions. 1 8 2 More generally, after formalism, the
next enemy of a progressive legal system in Europe is professionalism.
Professionalism also should be dismissed as the main agency of legal change. In
fact, professionalism is by its very nature an elitist phenomenon, which should be
subordinate to a democratic political process.
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Socially responsible legal change can stem only from the empowerment of
the people, thus exploiting the justice motive of the weak and the oppressed. This
is why the issue of access to law, which requires a substantial investment of
public funds into the judicial process, should be a top priority in our progressive
agenda.
Only in a second phase, once the people begin to trust the law again, by
fully appreciating its transformative potential, could the task of spelling out the
substantive rules of the game be started, perhaps in a first phase along the political
compromise of promoting and asserting redistributive and progressive projects
within European capitalism. However one should be aware that the social traits of
European capitalism were able to develop only in competition with the Socialist
alternative. Today, until the threat of such an alternative becomes credible again,
it is much more difficult to overcome and transform the many rules, principles
and ideologies that are biased in favor of profit over people. But departing from
the current ideology remains to be done, so that at least professional disruption of
the new European private law industry should happen sooner rather than later.
3.

Restructuring the field: Constitutions and Codes

In 2005, the French and the Dutch rejected the proposed European Constitution.1 8 3
In the weeks leading up to the vote, Left and Right political parties strengthened a
"No" coalition around two major important claims and obscured other voices in
the process, except the one, very popular on the right, of racism and
xenophobia. 184 While racism has been the independent agenda of the right, no
such an independent agenda has been produced on the left. The first common
claim was that the Constitution would enforce a neo-liberal economic model in

See http://europa.eu.int/constitution/referendum en.htm,"The people of France and the
Netherlands rejected the text of the Constitution on 29 May and 1 June respectively. In the light of
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184 See Jirgen Habermas, Le non illusoire de la gauche, NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, May 5, 2005
"[...] La capacit6 de r6gulation de l'Etat-nation ne suffit plus depuis longtemps h faire piece aux
cons6quences ambivalentes de la mondialisation 6conomique. Ce qui est c616br6 aujourd'hui
comme <modle social europ6en>' ne peut 6tre d6fendu que si, dans le cadre mime de l'Europe, la
politique est capable de revenir h la hauteur des march6s. Ce n'est qu'au niveau europ6en que l'on

pourra r6cup6rer tout ou partie de la capacit6 de r6gulation politique de toute fagon perdue au
niveau de l'Etat-nation. Les membres de l'UE renforcent aujourd'hui leur coop6ration dans les
domaines qui rel&vent de la politique de s6curit6 - la justice, le droit p6nal et l'immigration. Une
gauche active et lucide dans sa politique europ6enne aurait d6jh depuis longtemps incit6 h une
harmonisation beaucoup plus pouss6e, y compris dans les domaines de la politique 6conomique et
fiscale."
43

Global Jurist, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Frontiers),Art. 2

the European Union.18 5 The second claim was that national governments should
not be part of a technocratic Europe whose decisions take precedence over the
decisions of democratically elected national legislatures. 1 8 6 The fundamental
paradox that has characterized the constitutional process in Europe might well
close the issue of legitimate private law, forcing it into a conundrum. On the one
hand, a progressive transformation of private law requires its recognition as a
fundamental constitutional choice at the European level; but at the same time
many progressive visions, resist major transformations of European private law in
fear of capitalistic hegemony. On the other hand, the mainstream conservative
forces, those attempting to avoid the encounter between private law and the
political process, are the ones more active in pursuing ambitious transformations
of the private law system. From this conundrum it is difficult to emerge and
progressive legal theory is at risk of suffocation.1 87
In the aftermath of the demise of the European Constitutional treaty, the
EU is experiencing a contradictory process which can be looked upon from a
global perspective. On the one hand, it is now the institutional structure of a
market of some half billion people, with a larger GDP than the United States,
experiencing a continuous process of integration from the legal and economic
perspective. On the other hand, divisions and rivalry between the most important
Member States, as well as the lack of effective political processes and
policymaking, as well as of visionary Euro-friendly platforms on the left, have
strengthened the notion of a persisting democratic deficit while weakening the
institutional imagination of technocrats, jurists and scholars. The outcome of this
contradictory process has crated new skepticism and weakened political Europe,
which on the one hand is increasingly becoming a periphery of the corporate
dominated world, while on the other is increasingly dominated by United States
legal scholarship in a variety of legal domains.In this scenario, it is hard to believe that the making of a socially
responsible European private law can be perceived as a top priority, when such
fundamental issues such as a common defense, a common foreign policy, a
common immigration policy or comparable standards in education and social
See Bernard Cassen, ATTAC against the Treaty, NEW LEFT REVIEW, May-June 2005 at 27-8
"The collective appropriation of the treaty also had the effect of 'naturalizing' the European
question, long considered beyond the scope of national politics. For the first time, the link has
been made between neo-liberal policies formulated at EU level and those pursued 'at home."
186 Id. at 28; on the technocratic Europe see Jan-Werner Mlller, After the Double No, The EU's
best hope, Boston Review, November-December 2005.
17 See Duncan Kennedy, supra note 128 (explaining that a third globalization of legal thought is
characterized by a new legal consciousness which speaks the language of rights and neoformalism as well as the one of balancing conflicting policy values).
188 See Mattei Ugo, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 195 AM. J.
OF COMP. L. 195 (1994).
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protection, are neither solved nor even discussed openly. Nevertheless, the
observation that there are more important questions to tackle should not
discourage action in the domain of private law. On the contrary, private law in
Europe must perform as a constitutional societal space where individuals and
groups interact bound by private agreements or publicly enforced constraints thus
developing a genuine legal and social identity.1 89
True, as it is well known, the system of private law adjudication as
traditionally conceived has neither the sword nor the purse, the former being the
province of remedies and enforcement and the latter that of public law.
Nevertheless, it is exactly a restructuring of the field of private law that the left
should pursue in order to make the law serve the interests of the working class --traditional loser in social processes --- rather than those of the strong corporate
interests and of the elite. Within a traditional conception of the field of private law
it would be unfair to burden only the shoulders of European private law with the
task of radical redistribution of resources, the real issue that should be put on the
table today. But things are different when the political spaces of private law are
restructured. To put it simply, seen from a genuine leftist agenda, one of the big
hurdles in the making of a more socially civilized Europe is that the rich have too
many resources (use in part to condition the political process) and the poor too
few. Moreover, on average, each North Western European has too much if
compared to his South and Eastern fellows; and each European in general has too
much if compared to those that are maintained, by violent means, outside of the
walls of our shameful fortress. This state of affairs, due to the historical path of
capitalistic accumulation, has been very poorly resisted by the working class
because the bourgeois hegemony has artificially divided the losers of the political
processes, setting the ones against the others in fear of being demoted in their
capacity as consumers (an icon of this state of affairs has been the fear of the
Polish plumber). From the socialist perspective, that should remain embedded in
internationalism, these global inequalities cannot be justified and any legal system
can be considered legitimate only as long as it serves a purpose of progressively
diminishing them. Unfortunately, internal as well as international distributional
questions can only be partly tackled by means of the official (state or EU)
production of public law, given the current structure of international relations and
the current mainstream agenda in international financial institutions controlling
the flux of capitals. Nevertheless, what is not directly possible by official
legislation might be incrementally reached by restructuring private law, the
backbone of decentralized economic transactions.

189 See Teubner Gunther, Globalprivate regimes: Neo-spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of
Autonomous Sectors in World Society? in GLOBALIZATION AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE (Karl-Heinz
Ladeur ed., 2003).
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Because private law can be considered as a sort of economic constitution
there are a few points that should be remarked and fully considered in the
scholarly path towards its restructuring. To begin with, private law is one of the
fundamental domains in which the problems of externalities arise. It is the very
basic legal structure of the market so that issues of environmental harml 90 and
labor standards (just to talk about two of the most socially loaded areas of the law)
find into the private law regime the proper venue of discussion. A system of
private law that does not approach, in its fundamental philosophy, the political
choices that are mandated today by such important areas of externality
production, simply fails in its basic role to provide a proper legal regime for a
sustainable market. This is an area in which leftist scholarship should not find too
many difficulties in setting alliances with approaches more ready to accept
capitalism as the fundamental economic constitution of Europe. More difficult it
might be to find common platforms in areas such as the division of profit between
capital and labor, but even here examples of progressive law to look as models
should not be too difficult to find. Job security, limits to the lengths of the
workday, maternity and paternity leaves all the way to enterprise congestion and
profit sharing have been experienced here and there in the pastl 91 and should
today be restated, updated and proposed as viable alternatives to uncivilized
exploitation. Much of this can be accomplished even by way of interpretation of
the existing arsenal of anti-externalities private law remedies. To do so, however,
it is a priority that private law should be given a bite by incorporating in its very
structure the appropriate institutional apparatus. An apparatus that, from the left
could be used to give a real meaning to the idea that private property rights can be
tolerated only as far as they can demonstrate a degree of social utility by
providing a broad redistribution of income and by sustaining fundamental human
needs (think about landlord and tenant law).
Historical experience shows that in order to produce a break with
dominant trends capable of re-creating conditions of fairness, there is not only the
need for a strong community of legal scholars willing to explore new avenues of
inquiry and capable of translating notions such as those of equality and human
dignity, always offended by capitalistic exploitation, into rules of private law
notions. There is the need for a political will, able to inject into the law a degree
190

See for a first step in this direction, Gerritt Betlem, Environmental liability and the Private

Enforcement of Community Law, in Towards a European Civil Code, 677, in Towards a
Europe-an Civil Code, 3rd ed, (Martijn. Hesselink et al. eds., Kluwer Law International 2004)
arguing for an insertion of this area of the law into the Code.
191 For example in former Yugolsavia under the leadership of Tito, before Western exploitation
and imperialism has turned the Balkans in bloodshed. See G.A. BENACCHIO, LA PROPRIETA
NELL'IMPRESA AUTOGESTITA JUGOSLAVA (1988).

46

Mattei and Nicola: A 'Social Dimension' in European Private Law?

of political legitimacy and a self-critical philosophy, capable of understanding the
current global ideology and departing from it. Finally, there is the need of a
recognizable political function in the landscape of the sources of law. We find
such visible political inspiration and symbolic power in all the great codifications,
from the French, to the German, to the Italian, to the Mexican, to the DDR of
1975 just to offer the most visible examples. Most importantly, a reform of private
law, with its inevitable aspect of innovation, break with past, and revolt against a
previous order, inherently reflects a desire of progress, of move away from a
status quo that is perceived as non-desirable, perhaps also technically but certainly
politically and ideologically.
Here are some examples. In 1804 France was trying to move beyond the
class privileges of the Ancin Regime. In 1900 Germany was attempting a new
start as a mighty unitary empire, away from political divisions and warfare. In
1942 Italy was reacting against the bourgeois and liberal legal order. A similar
social revolt though grounded in a socialist rather than in a fascist philosophy,
characterized 1950 Mexico. The DDR produced, in 1975 an advanced and
innovative Civil Code, in an attempt to overcome bourgeois formalism,
professionalism and faked economic equality.
Such a need for political inspiration, to be sure, does not necessarily mean
that there is a need or a desire of an autocratic political rule, such as that in place
in most of the previous examples. Such inspiration could well come from the
bottom up, as a cultural legacy of an intellectual community of critical thinkers
worth their salt and not available of being transformed in yet another ideological
industry serving the dominant rhetoric. This global community needs to be
established. If this is the case, then a political platform capable of inspiring a "not
merely technical" system of private law can be inducted from the historical
moment that a social community is living, from the tensions and the stakes of
such moment, as reflected by constitution making exercises that might and indeed
do appear under new clothes in the present post-modem condition. In particular,
political inspiration and critical self-reflection can be induced in comparison with
other experiences, from a desire of identity of the European community in the
post cold war international order.
It would seem natural to seek such guidelines in a project with the
symbolic power such as the one represented by a Constitution. 19 2 Unfortunately,
as already mentioned, the European Constitutional process carried on by the
Convention and its presidium has been nothing more than a major failure, the
192

See P.Bourdieu, Space and Symbolic power,

REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY,

IN OTHER WORDS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A
153 (1990) (explaining that "In the symbolic struggle for the production

of common sense or, more precisely, for a monopoly over legitimating agents put into action the
symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous symbolic struggles which can be juridically
guaranteed.").
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product of a political oligarchy, lacking democratic legitimacy and promoting the
current neo-liberal order to constitutional status. It misused the label
"Constitution" for something that was little more than the charter of an "Old Boys
club," seeking in a mythological European past legitimization for the privileges of
the present ruling elites while letting out the others. 19 3 Unfortunately colonialism,
racism and authoritarianism show that the European past (and present) is less than
commendable and the present attitude towards anybody born outside of the walls
of fortress Europe make the future too dark to be inspirational for someone
seeking values for a "real" Constitution.
Despite these serious problems, the European charter of rights would have
offered a political mandate for a reform of private law governing the common
market. The welfarist nature of European capitalism, despite the refusal of some
of the most classic ideas such as the social function of property rights, is reasserted in the charter and is claimed as a strong aspect of European identity.194 It
might be expanded towards its socialist potentials. Both the political aspiration
and the previous path that reform must attempt to interrupt, are therefore a given.
The community of progressive legal scholars should interpret, apply and put in
practice such political aspirations and self-criticism in the next years of the
making of European private law by setting a proper agenda. As enlightened as a
scholarly community might be (and we might doubt of the current European
private law one, effectively normalized by its transformation into an industry) we
should not fall into the romantic Savignian idea (or ideology) that legal scholars
are the only interpreters of the "spirit of the people". The people themselves
should be empowered to talk about the law in order to make their sense of justice
(or of injustice) emerge. This is why we have to turn now to an area, that of access
to law, that should become integral part of a restructured progressive notion of
European private law. 195
4.

Restructuring the Field: Whose Access to Justice?

Access to justice empowers individuals in society. If it grants a bite to the private
law system; it may allow at least a minimum check by the people on the current
decline of legal civilization. This is why it should be a top priority of a leftist
agenda. The smartest legal professional cannot understand the law and see its
decline as deeply as someone suffering for its injustice. In "face to faceless

193 See for instance the non-voice of the "new member states" during the constitutional process.
The former eastern European countries where in fact given only an observer role without any
political power.
194 European social capitalism is well described as an alternative both to socialism and to neoliberalism by Michael Albert, supra note 151. A somehow more idealized, though highly
accessible description is in J.Rifkin, The European Dream (2004).
195 The classic is here Laura Nader, The Life
of the Law (2002).
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.

societies", such as the capitalistic ones, where someone whose rights are violated
by a Bank or a Telecom can only complain with an answering machine or with a
disempowered human being exploited in some call center, access to law is largely
reserved to the haves. Have nots are exluded by a system of courts in which
196
enforcement of rights is progressively
more expensive and privatized'
The consequence of this state of affairs is the separation of legal scholars
from the real life of the law. With no access to justice the law lacks a soul. It is
not a living social creature but it is reduced to a technocratic laboratory of "social
engineering". With no people's control of the law, legal civilization is bound to
decline. Individuals get disengaged and are transformed in passive spectators of
the "spectacle". The civic sense and the social participation into a process of
civilization are substituted by a brutish appetite for materialistic consumption.
Violated rights, such as those of airline travelers, can be cheaply bought by
corporations offering in compensation a few frequent fliers miles.
Currently, western legal civilization is in disarrays, most important
because of the attitude towards it of the world economic power. European legal
culture should not participate in this downgrading the rule of law into a pale
rhetoric, with access to justice only possible through entrepreneurial plaintiff
lawyers making out of a selected sample of the disgraces suffered by the many
victims of predatory capitalism. With no access to justice the "invisible hand" of
legal and economic integration works against the common interest favoring, to the
contrary, rent-seeking attitudes of capitalistic predators. Much of today
discussions about European private law do not come to term with the grim reality
of an almost complete disjunction between the law in the books and what happens
in practice.
European private law as a young field of inquiry, whose early
contributions date back in the late 1980s, thus developed in temporal connection
with the dismantling of social welfare institutions beginning under European
Union policies at the conclusion of the cold War. True, some early work was done
by a few pioneers, but European private law, as a field and an industry, is all
historically subsequent to the Reagan-Thatcher revolution. This is perhaps no
coincidence. The exciting perspective of building a new field could distract legal
scholars from the devastation of the very idea of legality and rights produced by
that reactionary political platform. Paradoxically, the revolutionary transformation
produced by post 1989 neo-liberal triumph was vandalizing legality in countries
such as England and the U.S., much admired abroad for their legal systems. Any
social platform in European law today should start from a full consciousness of
the devastating effect of neo-liberalism on legality and should first attempt a
counter-revolution aimed at making good the damage done. In this light, central to
See Laura Nader and Harry Todd, No Access to Law: Alternatives to the U.S. JudicialSystem
(1980).
196
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a socially concerned platform, much before the need to change a few black letters
in our codes should be the issue of access to justice.
The issue of access to justice is particularly instructive from our
perspective. In researching the field, 197 we noticed that a first intensive wave of
writing on the field shortly proceeded the so called-Reagan-Thatcher revolution,
the moment in which public institutions started being transformed and
significantly privatized. Cappelletti's famous collective project 98 , in particular,
witnessed a moment of general optimism in the public interest model, an idea of
activist, re-distributive, democratizing, public-service minded approach to the
public sector in general and to private law in particular. In that intellectual mode
of thought, the Welfare State in Western Societies was seen as a point of arrival in
civilization, and access to justice was the device through which communities
could provide law as a public good, after having provided shelter, healthcare and
education to the needy. True, in the same years, Laura Nader's work was already
skeptical of the possibility to provide law to the people in faceless industrial
societies, and prophetically suspicious towards the rise of the ADR industry, but it
was still motivated by a sincere belief in the possibility to bring justice to the
people.199

Beginning in the early eighties, the global ideological picture changed.
Neo-liberal policies, inaugurated by prime minister Thatcher in Great Britain, the
crib of the welfare state, and imported on a much weaker institutional background
in Reagan's America, were based on the very basic assumption that the Welfare
state was simply too expensive. A Western capitalist model, busy to outspend the
Soviet block in order to win the cold war, had to save resources by privatizing as
much of its welfare services as possible. Public shelters, health, education and
justice for the poor were the natural "victims" of such cut-backs. By the end of the
eighties, with the "successful" outcome of the cold war, this policy of
"privatization" had overcome the boundaries of the Anglo-American world, as
well as those of the traditional political right. At the "end of history", redistributional practices, both direct and indirect could not be structurally afforded
in the domain of shelter and health, let alone in those, secondary in survival
importance, of education and justice.
With no desire to invest money in legal aid and programs of access to
courts for the poor, with a quite sustained cultural crusade against the welfare
state and its policies, the future of access to justice, in the original sense of
granting equal opportunities to litigation for the rich and the poor, seemed quite
One of the authors is also the General Reporter for the "Access to Justice" project of the
International Academy of Comparative Law conference scheduled for July 2006 in Utrecht.
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See M. Cappelletti et al., Access to Justice and the Welfare State (1978)
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Laura Nader's intellectual itinerary (and bibliography) can be followed by reading, Laura

Nader, The Life of The Law (2002).
50

Mattei and Nicola: A 'Social Dimension' in European Private Law?

grim. Some countries simply stopped worrying about the unsatisfactory state of
their systems of access to justice, while others, where the system was more ahead,
were undermining its legitimacy by working out even more privatized and justiceremote models of dispute resolution. The birth of the ADR industry, and the
development of a professional class of mediators, not necessarily trained in the
law, and serving the interests of harmony and non-adversary social control, had
transformed the issue of access to courts of law for everybody in that of limiting
as much as possible such access, by creating an alternative not based on adversary
justice but on harmony and governmentality, 200 most importantly, quite entirely
privatized. These general transformations of western law, involving a variety of
aspects of the legal system, including the rehabilitative ideal (itself expensive) in
criminal law, and more generally the target of pursuing social justice through law,
have been exported worldwide, incorporated in Structural Adjustment Programs
and other vehicles of diffusion of "global" legal thinking2 0 1
Only in very recent times, some scholars became aware of the fact that in
the years of the demise of the Welfare State, access to justice was transformed in
a non issue (as witnessed by the disappearance of all the scholarly literature)
substituted by a quite opposite and almost certainly "invented" problem, that of
"litigation explosion" 202 . Accordingly, the solution to the flood of litigation was
closing of the doors of adversary justice for everybody, in particular for the
weaker market actors and the development of a new "industry" that of ADR
governed by the ideology of harmony and social peace. To be sure, the closing of
the doors of justice for the non-wealthy constitutes a further empowerment of the
strong economic actors. Because there is no legal venue relatively open to the
average individual, powerful market actors are free not to confront the social
consequences of their actions. With no desire to invest money in law as a public
good, what follows is lawlessness and bullying of the strong over the weak.
Consequently, after a legitimized process of law reform it is access to justice that
claims a role of top priority for any agenda aimed at social justice through the
law.
Access to justice is today intimately connected to the idea of consumer's
rights, itself central, as we have seen, to the cultural DNA of European private
law. It was not by chance that in the previous sections of this Article we have
discussed the ideological stakes in unfair consumer's contractual terms.
Nevertheless, there is a point that needs to be clarified. A progressive private law
In the sense of the famous College de France lectures of M. Foucault.
I discuss this evolution in Ugo Mattei, A Theory ofImperialLaw: A Study on U.S. Hegemony
and the latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2002), also available online in
200
201

Global Jurist Frontiers.
202 See Mark Galanter, News from Nowhere. The DebasedDebate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L.
REV. 77 (1993).
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agenda can by no means be satisfied even by a fully satisfactory level of
consumer's satisfaction guaranteed by some cheap and easily accessible remedial
venue. Consumerism has characterized and still characterizes much of the
institutional evolution of European private law, and many leftist scholars have
perceived it as a progressive platform. Consumerism nevertheless is a foe of a
progressive agenda of post -capitalistic transformation of society performing as a
trap in which unfortunately some of the best and more generous intellects of leftist
legal scholars have fallen. Consumerism only sets a more advanced frontier of
global capitalism, making its unsustainable model of development softer, more
user-friendly and ultimately more resistant to radical change. One should be
aware that the e-transformation of citizens and individuals into consumers is to be
sure one of the most dangerous cultural transformations produced by post-modern
capitalism. It destroys class consciousness, and disempowers the resisting
potential of the proletariat, by transforming even the free time of the working
class into non compensated work in which alienated workers, transformed into
consumers of useless commodities, relentlessly shop around for better deals,
invariably favoring the corporate power 20 3 . When we point at access to justice as
one of the most important areas that should be explored in order to restructure the
field of private law, we do not wish to fall into this trap. Corporations are all
favorable to cheap venues where consumers can exchange their less than
satisfactory merchandises, and are even available to bribe the few ones still
having the energy to protest by offering them some material compensation. This
allows standards of production to be kept low, with further exploitation of
unskilled proletariat in sweat shops and lowers the risk of the rise of actual social
responsibility. It is sufficient to see the long lines of consumers in the exchange
departments of the major American chains of consumer's goods distribution.
These people are made happy by a mere substitution of a defective product with a
working one, nobody compensating them for the extra time and expenses arising
for the need to return and change a product paid perhaps hundreds of dollars and
bought by the retailer in the South of the world for a few cents.
Should the left care for this kind of access to justice? Should obtaining
easy ADR venues for slightly more complicated issues than changing a poorly
working CD player be something worth struggling for? The answer is
emphatically no. To the contrary, the kind of justice that we need to guarantee is
the genuinely redistributive one, in which ill gotten profits are disgorged and in
which the people lucky enough to be born within the walls of fortress Europe
vindicate, in the public interest, also the rights of their less fortunate fellows on
whose suffering and degradation the current pattern of capitalist development is
based. What we should care about is the sense of justice of civic individuals
This image of the consumer as someone working without knowing that he is doing so has been
introduced for the first time by French sociologist Beaudrillard.
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concerned for their brothers, not that of brutish individualistic consumers. For this
kind of access to justice is worth struggling, within a broad conception of private
law aimed at offering the institutional framework of a civilized pattern of global
exchanges.
5.

Diversity and Distribution: Why should we care?

Not only should the left attempt to restructure the field of private law by making it
comprehensive of issues of inclusion and social transformation that traditionally
are beyond its scope. We should also be aware of some of the most important
observations thus far available. The most important lessons in economic sociology
in the realm of European contract law came from Gunther Teubner's study on the
harmonization process, which began with the Unfair Terms directive transposed
in different territories of the EU. 204 According to Teubner, the harmonization of
contract law, rather than unifying has irritated domestic legal regimes, thus
creating deeper cleavages among different legal systems. In taking seriously this
lesson seriously, one might be tempted to conclude that harmonization or private
law rules are per se a self-defeating strategy so that no political agenda can be
accomplished by this tool. While Teubner is an atheist with regard to
harmonization, he clearly shows that the effects of harmonization in different
socio-economic contexts produce more diversity rather than unity. Therefore any
welfarist provision, hard code or any private law directive will have different
effects as well as a different impact in terms of creating costs or benefits for
different groups. It should thus be appreciated in context, with a clear vision of
who are the winners and who the losers of the social processes it has produced in
order to take side in favor of the latter. In other words, a progressive platform in
European private law should operate a distributional analysis and always take side
for the weak.
Another important lesson from Teubner's work is that the evaluation of the
economic and social impact of harmonized private law rules in the EU is a job not
only for economists, but also for lawyers. Such perspective resonates in the works
of United States private law scholar Robert Hale who demonstrated in the 1920s
how a choice between two different private law rules, including whether a judge
or a legislator makes it, entails a new distribution of bargaining power among
private individuals.2 0 5 Thus, in addressing the impact of harmonization on private
204

See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants,supra note 97; and more recently, Pierre Legrand, On the

Singularity ofLaw, 47 HARv. INT'L L.J. 517 (2006).
205 See Robert L. Hale., Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM.
L. REv. 603, 627-

28 (1943) ("Bargaining power would be different were it not that the law endows some with rights
that are more advantageous than those with which it endows others. It is with these unequal rights
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law, progressive lawyers ought to clarify how each particular rule expresses a
choice that shapes the bargaining power of the parties directly and indirectly
involved in the dispute.2 06
However the diversity triggered by the implementation of European
directives is becoming a dramatic one because who will have to bear the highest
costs of its dreadful consequences often happen to be consumers over producers,
the southern or the new member states over the old core of Member States and the
immigrants over the EU citizens. Take for example the Product Liability saga
triggered by the directive. In Gonzaliz,2 07 Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S 2 08 and
209
recently in the theatrical repetition of the saga Commission v. France,
the ECJ
proved its authority, by finally imposing though a penalty its interpretation of the
directive after more than twenty years of French resistance.210 The ECJ nonconsumer friendly interpretation of the Product liability directive, often following
the Commission view on the matter, has dramatically changed domestic tort rules
and their distributional impact not just in France, but also in Spain and Denmark,
directly involved in the issue, but throughout Europe. These ECJ cases
demonstrate that the regulation of defective products aims to respond to severe
personal injuries and health risks for consumers. Thus, in evaluating injuries, risks
and allocation of costs through tort law, judges ought to acknowledge the variety
of domestic private law regimes -including not only tort but also contract and
property rules- as well as the highly diverse national health care systems and
-211
pharmaceutical regulations.
In adopting a distributive analysis to inform their decision, progressive
jurists should make two preliminary considerations. First, all the above legal
factors are crucial because they constitute the background rules, which are closely
interrelated to domestic tort law regimes. These background rules shape the
bargaining power of the parties involved in the dispute and they have an impact in
determining winners and losers in the choice between alternative liability rules.

See Duncan Kennedy, The PoliticalStakes in the "Merely Technical" Issues of Contractlaw, 1
EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 7 (2001).
207 Case C-183/00 Gonzalez Sanchez, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3901 ¶ 25 decided
by the ECJ at the same
time as Case C-52/00, Comm'n v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3827 ¶ 16, Case C-152/00 Comm'n v.
Greece 2002 E.C.R. 1-3879, ¶ 12.
208 See, Case C- 402/03, Skov A£g versus Bilka Lavprivarehus
A/S and Bilka LavprisvarehusA/S,
2006.
209 See Case C-177/04, Comm'n v France, 2006, Judgment of the
Court (Grand Chamber) of 14
March 2006.
210 See Daniela Caruso, supra
note 149.
211
Sapir Andr6, Globalisation and the Reforms of European Social Models (2005)
www.bruegel.org . Marie-Eve Arbour, Compensationfor Damages Caused by Defective Drugs:
European Private Law between Safety Requirements and Free Market Values, 10 EuR. L.J. 87
(2004).
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Second, because of the great variety of background rules in the EU -due to
the multiplicity of welfare systems as well as private law regimes- the decision
to change a liability rule in name of European uniformity, will also increase the
unequal redistribution of resources among Member States, thus creating greater
diversity and deeper social cleavages rather than better harmonization in the
212
internal
market.
For instance, changing a liability rule in Spain or in Greece, where there is
a universal or national healthcare system, is radically different than changing a
liability rule in continental or Anglo-Saxon Member States in which consumers
buy private health insurances at times subsidized by the State. By restricting the
protection afforded to consumers by domestic tort rules, European judges have
increased inequalities among fellow Europeans. In fact, injured parties situated in
Mediterranean countries will find it more difficult to recover than those situated in
continental or Anglo-Saxon countries. The latter group of consumers could sue
for health related injuries an insurer under contract law rather than tort law. Thus,
when the ECJ imposes uniformity on a market that is still divided by social and
cultural barriers, which are not necessarily undesirable from a distributive
standpoint, it also creates new inequalities among European individuals.
By adopting a distributive analysis, when jurists chose between two
alternative private law they have to openly acknowledge and offer to political
discussion the costs and the benefits of their decisions for the parties directly and
non-directly involved in the dispute. In realizing the effects they are producing,
they might suggest softening the need of uniformity or maximal harmonization in
European private law. If they decide to continue in their striving for uniformity,
rather than justifying their choices through a textualist interpretations or
arguments which entail separation of powers and supremacy of Community law,
they should openly acknowledge the winners and the losers of the decision to
unify a given area. In our case, Spanish medical businesses and Danish
distributors clearly won at the expense of national consumers.
To be sure, in acknowledging the costs and benefits stemming from a
liability rule, a distributive analysis requires an inquiry into the facts and a thick
knowledge of the legal and socio-economic regimes in which the dispute takes
place. True, substantive information is available in scholarly works and studies
conducted by the European Commission on the varieties of welfare regimes and
different product liability systems within the Member States.21 3 If we do not trust
such information that might be biased or distorted by the "industry" then we
should pay greater attention and debate more openly the role of courts for carrying
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out a distributive analysis and openly-acknowledging their political choices in
their decision impacting the local context.
6.

Conclusion

In this article we have surveyed the current debates creating sparks in European
private law scholarship and deep dissents among European lawyers. We have
explained why the notion of a social private law holds no clarifying meaning and
thus remains ambiguous and open to controversies. We have also claimed that a
notion of Social Europe is a controversial one, due to the pluralities of welfare
regimes as well as the alternative hegemonic project that Europe represents today
for global markets.
Our claim is that today in Europe as in the past "the Social" in private law
does not necessarily fulfill the needs of a progressive, let alone a socialist agenda.
Instead, in coalescing under the rubric that the "Social" scholars have
compromised over important issues that should be reconsidered because giving a
human face to capitalist exploitation cannot be seen as a progressive agenda.
We have also highlighted some of the main problems and offered
methodological alternatives as well as policy proposal for what we called a
transformative agenda for a European private law. Our claim is that any project
for European private law should go beyond coalitions around social justice.
Instead, it should restructure the field of private law by creating strategic alliances
on specific targets (access to justice, distributive outcomes, empowerment of
labor) linking scholarly, political and judicial forces in the construction of a
progressive agenda capable to serve the interests of the multitudes and of human
civilization.
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